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I.  INTRODUCTION 
“I think Governor Taft must be trying to privatize Ohio’s schools.”1 
Public education in the State of Ohio is in turmoil.  Many public school 
administrators began the 2004-2005 school year with fewer teachers, less funding, 
and more students than the previous year.2  A record number of local public school 
districts submitted tax levies to the voters this past year in an effort to raise essential 
funds locally, and a record number of these levies failed.3  Meanwhile, Ohio 
                                                                
1Statement by the principal of a Cleveland Public Elementary School in a middle-class 
neighborhood after explaining that she would begin the 2004-2005 school year with fewer 
teachers, less funding, and more students.  Interview with anonymous Principal, Cleveland 
Public Schools, (April, 2004). 
2Patrick O’Donnell, School Budgets on Chopping Block Statewide; Area Districts Aren’t 
Alone in Making Cuts, THE PLAIN DEALER, May 2, 2004, at B1 (noting that the 2.1% increase 
in state funding for the 2004/2005 school year is outpaced by inflation and the rising cost of 
health care); Desperate Districts; Look at the Aug. 3 Ballot and Discover Further Evidence of 
the Statehouse Failure to Overhaul School Funding, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, July 20, 2004, 
at 3 (noting that as many as 4,000 teachers were eliminated statewide).   
3Michael Scott, Reeling School Districts Start Cutting, THE PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 10, 2005, 
at B1 (chronicling the recent February, 2005 school levy failures); Katie Byard, Akron, Ohio, 
Area’s School-Tax Pass Rate is Average, Study Says, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, Nov. 4, 2004; 
Katie Byard, Akron, Ohio-area Schools Hope Presidential Election Brings Votes for Funding, 
AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, Oct. 18, 2004 (stating that “on the Nov. 2 ballot in Ohio [v]oters 
will decide slightly more than 300 issues [related to school tax requests]”);  Katie Byard, 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol53/iss3/7
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historically provides private schools with more state aid than any other state4 and 
continues to spend state money supporting privatization experiments, such as 
vouchers and charter schools managed or owned by private entities.5  Finally, despite 
Ohio Supreme Court rulings in the DeRolph case declaring the General Assembly’s 
system of providing for public schools unconstitutional, and unequivocally requiring 
the General Assembly to overhaul the system,6 the General Assembly has not 
complied with the spirit of the Court’s ruling.  Like the entire issue of school 
funding, the reasons for the General Assembly’s inaction are incredibly complex and 
interwoven.   
This Note argues that Ohio has become a political science experiment in 
educational privatization and that “Community Schools” have become the 
laboratories.  That is, one of the main reasons that the State of Ohio under-funds 
public education is that the state's guiding educational policy is privatization.  The 
Ohio courts can address this issue by recognizing that the Ohio Constitution's 
                                                          
 
Wayne County, Ohio, Teachers, Administrators Won’t Take Raises Amid Budget Woes, 
AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, July 22, 2004 ( “Statewide, there will be 103 school tax issues on 
the Aug. 3 ballot – the highest ever since August elections were initiated in 1984. . . . ‘This 
levy is not going to make us flush,’ said Superintendent Steve Caples.  ‘The levy [will] allow 
only a bare-bones budget’ . . . .”). 
4GERALD W. BRACEY, THE WAR AGAINST AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS:  PRIVATIZING 
SCHOOLS, COMMERCIALIZING EDUCATION 98 (2002) (quoting from Dennis J. Willard and Doug 
Oplinger, Charter Experiment Goes Awry, Akron Beacon Journal, Dec. 12, 1999, at A1). 
5See Douglas Oplinger & Dennis J. Willard, Legislature Oks Two-Year Budget--$51.2 
Billion Plan Continues Pattern of Curbing Aid for Public Schools, Backing Charters, 
Vouchers, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, Jun. 22, 2005, at A1; Sandy Theis, Taft Plans to Expand 
Vouchers, THE PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 10, 2005, at A1 ( “Private schools would benefit; public 
education gets little boost.”); Thomas Suddes, Catholic Vote Could Matter in November, THE 
PLAIN DEALER, May 12, 2004, at B9 (“[I]t’s likely that no state spends proportionately more 
than Ohio . . . to help parents afford non-public (i.e., often Catholic) schools.”); Scott 
Stephens, Ohio Virtually Booming With Cyber Schools, THE PLAIN DEALER, June 27, 2004, at 
A1 ( “Ohio is leading the nation in cyber-schools, and not just by a little.  It’s a virtual rout.”); 
Scott Stephens, Schools Out $376 Million to Charters; Cuyahoga Will Transfer $71 Million, 
THE PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 17, 2004, at B1. Ohio spent approximately 424 million dollars on 
charter schools during the 2004-2005 school year, an increase of 122 million over the previous 
year.  Doug Oplinger & Dennis J. Willard, Budget Clauses Benefit Charters – Ohio House Bill 
Meant to Cap Growth Restricts Public Districts, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, Apr. 23, 2005, at 
A1.  Of that 424 million, one private, for-profit Educational Management Corporation 
(“EMO”), White Hat Management, received 107 million, or about 25 percent of the total.  Id. 
6DeRolph v. State of Ohio, 780 N.E.2d 529 (Ohio 2002) [hereinafter DeRolph IV]; 
DeRolph v. State of Ohio, 754 N.E.2d 1184 (Ohio 2001) [hereinafter DeRolph III]; DeRolph 
v. State of Ohio, 728 N.E.2d 993 (Ohio 2000) [hereinafter DeRolph II]; DeRolph v. State of 
Ohio, 677 N.E. 2d 733 (Ohio 1997) [hereinafter DeRolph I].  DeRolph I was initially filed in 
1991.  In addition, the final decision related to the case was The State ex rel. State of Ohio v. 
Lewis, 789 N.E.2d 195 (Ohio 2003), in which the Court issued a writ of prohibition to the trial 
judge of the case, finally and unambiguously relinquishing jurisdiction over the case.  This 
decision is sometimes referred to as DeRolph V.  Thus, the litigation spanned at least a decade 
and included four successive admonitions from the Court to the General Assembly to execute 
their constitutional mandate regarding public education. 
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approach to public education is inconsistent with privatization.  The Ohio 
Constitution is inconsistent with privatization because the Constitution views 
education as a public benefit and requires that the state assure that every child 
receives an adequate education, while privatization views education as a private 
benefit and sees the state as responsible for giving every family the opportunity to 
pursue a free education.  Charter schools, and the arguments raised by their 
opponents, exemplify this conflict.7  Therefore, the Ohio courts should invalidate the 
privatization aspects of charter school laws in order to redirect the educational policy 
of the state toward the constitutional conception of public schooling.  An opportunity 
to do so is currently before the Ohio Supreme Court in the form of a constitutional 
challenge to Ohio’s “community schools.”  (“Community school” is Ohio’s name for 
the type of schools generally known as charter schools.8  This Note will use the terms 
“charter schools” and “community schools” interchangeably.) 
The narrow purpose of this Note is to evaluate the constitutionality of charter 
schools under the Ohio Constitution.  Charter schools (i.e., Ohio community schools) 
are nominally public schools that are funded by the state, but independently operated 
and governed.9  Privatization generally and charter schools specifically are hotly 
contested topics with both strong and baldly self-serving arguments on all sides.10  
Therefore, instead of addressing privatization head-on, this Note attempts to discuss 
privatization in the limited context of the current constitutional claims against Ohio 
community schools.11  This Note argues that several modes of privatization that are 
embedded in the Ohio community school laws are fundamentally inconsistent with 
the Ohio Constitution.  Therefore, the legal challenges to community schools should 
be decided in favor of the plaintiffs, and the Ohio General Assembly should be 
required to eliminate community schools or, better still, significantly revise their 
governing statutes. 
                                                                
7State of Ohio ex rel. Ohio Cong. of Parents and Teachers v. State of Ohio Bd. of Educ., 
No. 03AP-508, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 4009 (10th Ohio Ct. App. 2004).  The plaintiff’s Third 
Amended Complaint at the trial court level sets forth the claims against charter schools in 
detail.  See Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint, Ohio Cong. of Parents and Teachers v. State 
of Ohio Bd. of Educ., Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, available at 
http://cpeinfo.ohea.org/ Archives/Amended%20Complaint%20March%202002.htm (last 
visited Aug. 31, 2005).  For more information on this case at the trial court level, see Judge 
McGrath’s trial court opinion.  Ohio State Federation of Teachers v. State of Ohio Bd. of 
Educ. (2003) No. 01-CVH-05-4457, Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, available at 
http://ds.columbuslawlib.org:8080/docushare/dsweb/GetRendition/ Document-2247/html (last 
visited Aug. 31, 2005).  
8State ex rel. Ohio Cong. of Parents and Teachers v. State Bd. of Educ., 105 Ohio St. 3d 
1437 (2005) (granting certiori); see also Justices to Mull Suit Opposing Charter Schools, THE 
TOLEDO BLADE, Feb. 17, 2005, at A6.   
9Id. at 2.  Ohio community school—i.e., charter school—laws are set forth in chapter 3314 
of the Ohio Revised Code.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN § 3314 (LexisNexis 2004).   
10Henry M. Levin, Studying Privatization in Education in PRIVATIZING EDUCATION:  CAN 
THE MARKETPLACE DELIVER CHOICE, EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND SOCIAL COHESION? 4 (Henry 
M. Levin ed., 2001); Kevin B. Smith, The Ideology of Education:  The Commonwealth, the 
Market, and America’s Schools 2 (2003). 
11State ex rel. Ohio Congress of Parents and Teachers, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 4009. 
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Because “school choice”12 is currently a potent political issue, such a judicial 
ruling could help to maintain or augment political pressure on the Ohio General 
Assembly to enact a system of public education that is consistent with the Common 
School ideology of a single, state-funded system of universal education that is at the 
heart of the Ohio Constitution’s education clause.13  Charter schools could be an 
aspect of the constitutional system, although not in their present form. 
Part II of this Note briefly discusses the current state of public education in Ohio 
and outlines the DeRolph litigation and its implications.  Part III focuses on the 
“thorough and efficient” education clause14 in the Ohio Constitution and analyzes its 
meaning from an historical perspective.  Part IV addresses the theory behind the 
privatization of education in general, briefly discusses the history of privatization, 
and introduces different types of educational privatization in Ohio.  Part V compares 
the ideology behind the education clause in the Ohio Constitution with privatization 
ideology and concludes that the two ideologies are in conflict.  Part VI discusses 
Ohio Congress of Parents & Teachers v. State of Ohio Board of Education,15 a 
pending Ohio case challenging the constitutionality of community schools, and 
evaluates the plaintiffs’ claims within the context of the privatization aspects of 
Ohio’s community school laws.  After predicting that the Ohio Supreme Court will 
uphold Ohio’s community school laws, the section proposes general revisions to the 
Ohio charter school laws to bring them within the confines of the Ohio Constitution.  
Finally, the Note suggests that an outcome in the case that is consistent with the Ohio 
Constitution could act as a catalyst for a political shift in the guiding educational 
policy of the General Assembly away from community school legislation grounded 
in privatization ideology and toward a constitutional community school. 
II.  PUBLIC EDUCATION IN OHIO AFTER DEROLPH IV 
A.  DeRolph v. State of Ohio 
The DeRolph case is important to any discussion of public education in Ohio 
because it broadly defines the current legal and political landscape surrounding the 
issue.  In the most recent decision in the ongoing litigation, the Ohio Supreme Court 
held in 2002 that the current system of providing public education to Ohio’s children 
                                                                
12
“‘School Choice’ is an umbrella term that is used to discuss various reform proposals 
including tuition vouchers, charter schools, and magnet school programs.”  Molly O’Brien & 
Amanda Woodrum, The Constitutional Common School, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 581, 583 n9 
(2004).   
13OHIO CONST. OF 1851, art. VI, § 2.  This clause of the Ohio Constitution, known as the 
“thorough and efficient” clause, provides as follows:   
The general assembly shall make such provisions, by taxation, or otherwise, as, with 
the income arising from the school trust fund, will secure a thorough and efficient 
system of common schools throughout the State; but no religious or other sect, or 
sects, shall ever have any exclusive right to, or control of, any part of the school funds 
of this state.   
Id. 
14Id. 
15State ex rel. Ohio Congress of Parents and Teachers, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 4009. 
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violates the “thorough and efficient” clause of the Ohio Constitution.16   That clause 
states, in pertinent part, that:  “The general assembly shall make such provisions, by 
taxation or otherwise, as . . . will secure a thorough and efficient system of common 
schools throughout the state . . . .”17  However, after finding a constitutional violation 
the Court refused to retain jurisdiction over the remedy, leaving it to the Ohio 
General Assembly alone to create a “thorough and efficient” system in compliance 
with the Constitution.18  Much has been written about school funding and the 
intricacies of the DeRolph case declaring the system unconstitutional.19  Therefore, a 
brief summary of the case history should suffice here.   
In 1991, an alliance of 27520 mostly poor and rural school districts calling 
themselves “the Ohio Coalition for Equity and Adequacy of School Funding” 
brought suit against the State of Ohio.21  The Coalition claimed that the system of 
funding education was completely inadequate and violated the Ohio Constitution.  
After a victory for the Coalition in the Perry County Common Pleas Court in front of 
Judge Linton Lewis Jr. the State appealed all the way to the Ohio Supreme Court, 
which affirmed Judge Lewis’s finding of unconstitutionality.22 
Ohio Supreme Court Justice Francis Sweeney’s 1997 majority opinion in 
DeRolph I adeptly summarized the problems with Ohio’s public schools and the 
method of funding them.23  Contrary to the national trend, Ohio public schools were 
                                                                
16DeRolph IV, 780 N.E.2d at 530.  
17Ohio Const. of 1851, art. VI, § 2. 
18Lewis, 789 N.E.2d at 203. 
19For an early survey of national school funding litigation, see Molly McUsic, The Use of 
Education Clauses in School Finance Reform Litigation, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 307, 310 
(1991).  Numerous articles have also been written about school funding in Ohio and the 
DeRolph litigation specifically.  See, e.g., Michael L. Stokes, Judicial Restraint and the 
Presumption of Constitutionality, 35 U. TOL. L. REV. 347 (2003); Josh Kagan, Note,  A Civics 
Action:  Interpreting “Adequacy” in State Constitutions’ Education Clauses, 78 N.Y.U.L. 
REV. 2241 (2003); Thomas B.R. Christenson, II, State School Funding:  DeRolph v. State, 97 
Ohio St. 3d 434, 2002 Ohio 6750, 780 N.E.2d 529, Decided December 11, 2002, 29 OHIO 
N.U.L. REV. 839 (2003); Ronald M. McMillan, Please Senator, I Want Some More: The 
General Assembly Gets an “F” from the DeRolph Court, 45 CLEV. ST. L. REV.773 (1997); 
James C. Joslin, Note, Developing a School Funding Remedy Framework for Ohio and 
Beyond, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1247 (1995); Morris L. Hawk, Comment, “As Perfect As Can Be 
Devised”:  DeRolph v. State of Ohio and the Right to Education in Ohio, 45 CASE W. RES. 
679 (1995). 
20Two-hundred and seventy-five school districts represented almost half of the total (612) 
public school districts in Ohio.  The Coalition eventually grew to over 500 districts.  Interview 
with Jayne Geneva, Ohio Coalition for Equity and Adequacy of School Funding, in Cleveland, 
Ohio (Feb. 7, 2005) (on file with author). 
21DeRolph v. State of Ohio, No. 22043, (Perry County, July 1, 1994); Scott Stephens, 
School Funding: Textbook Failure; Court Edicts, Genuine Efforts Haven’t Solved Ohio’s 
Problem, THE PLAIN DEALER, October 17, 2004, at A1.   
22DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d 733.   
23Id. 
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primarily dependant on local property taxes, not state funds, for revenue.24  
Furthermore, the amount of money given to each district by the state was based on 
the amount of money in the state budget at the time, not the cost of educating a child 
or maintaining a school.25  As a result of this deeply flawed funding structure, as of 
1996 ninety-five percent of Ohio school buildings needed repairs, only seventeen 
percent of schools’ heating systems were adequate, districts lacked sufficient funds 
to comply with the state mandated teacher to student ratio, and Ohio ranked last 
among the states in number of computers per student.26  As Justice Sweeney 
observed, education “ranks miserably low in the state’s priorities,” despite “the 
historical notion that the education of our youth is of utmost concern and that Ohio 
children should be educated adequately so that they are able to participate fully in 
society.”27  
Although the legislature addressed some of the Court’s concerns and enacted 
some legislation designed to narrow the funding gap between wealthy and poor 
school districts, the same basic issues and positions remained throughout the 
subsequent DeRolph cases in 2000, 2001, and 2002.28  Chief among the General 
Assembly’s failures was the failure to allocate a per-pupil amount deemed sufficient 
to provide a constitutionally adequate education.29   
As Justice Resnick stated in her DeRolph IV concurring opinion, “[i]t becomes 
obvious that the only practical solution to the dilemma posed by this case lies with 
the citizens of Ohio.”30  Nonetheless, there may still be a limited role for the Court to 
                                                                
24Id. at 738.   
25Id.  The amount of state aid “is determined as a result of working backwards through 
the state aid formula after the legislature determines the total dollars to be allocated to 
primary and secondary education in each biennial budget.  Thus, the foundation level 
reflects political and budgetary considerations at least as much as it reflects a 
judgment as to how much money should be spent . . . .”  
Id.   
26Id. at 742-744. 
27Id. at 745. 
28See DeRolph II, 728 N.E.2d at 1020 (“[T]he mandate of the Constitution has not yet 
been fulfilled. . . . The most glaring weakness in the state’s attempts to put in place a thorough 
and efficient system of education is the failure to specifically address the overreliance on local 
property taxes.”); DeRolph III, 754 N.E.2d at 1184 (holding that the Court would not continue 
to exercise jurisdiction partially because the legislature had made improvements but mostly 
because “no one is served by continued uncertainty and fractious debate.”); DeRolph IV, 780 
N.E.2d at 530 (vacating the decision in DeRolph III and holding that “DeRolph I and II are the 
law of the case, and the current school funding system is unconstitutional”).  Justice Resnick’s 
characterization of Justice Moyer’s concurring opinion is also instructive.  Id. at 532.  “[T]he 
Chief Justice ignores the deficiencies in the legislative response thus far and . . . seems to 
believe that a battle half-fought is equivalent to a resounding victory as long as this court is no 
longer involved in this case.”  Id. 
29Debbie Phillips, Executive Director, Ohio Fair Schools Campaign, Address at the City 
Club of Cleveland Panel Discussion:  Fixing Ohio School Finance:  The Governor’s Blue 
Ribbon Task Force on Financing Student Success (Jan. 10, 2005). 
30DeRolph IV, 780 N.E.2d at 534.  Justice Resnick goes on to propose that the voters pass 
a constitutional amendment requiring an adequate amount be spent on public education.  Id.  
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2005
474 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:467 
play in this drama.31  By taking a strong stance on politically sensitive issues such as 
privatization legislation, the Court might be able to activate the solution that Justice 
Resnick identified – the political process.   
B.  The State of Education in Ohio 
Meanwhile, the Ohio economy has taken a steady turn for the worse, and state 
funds in general are scarce.32  State aid to education increased by 3.2 percent in 2003, 
followed by 2.4 percent in 2004, and 2.1 percent for 2005.33  However, given that the 
national inflation rate is approximately two percent and health care costs are 
increasing at a rate of approximately four percent, this “increase” is actually a 
decrease in terms of percentage of district need.34   
The economic downturn in the state also affects citizens’ willingness to vote for 
local school tax levies.  Because local property tax revenue is still fundamental to the 
state system of providing for public education (in spite of the DeRolph Court’s 
mantra), record numbers of school districts put school levies on the ballots in the fall 
of 2004.35  However, only forty-five percent of school issues on the November 2004 
ballot passed statewide, representing the lowest annual success rate in a decade.36  
Many districts will have to continue to cut staff and programs simply to meet 
operating expenses, and some teachers in districts across the state have agreed to 
forego standard pay raises.37  It is important to emphasize that these school levies, for 
the most part, are necessary to meet basic needs and not to add additional programs 
or build posh administrative offices.38  Therefore when a levy does not pass, any 
discretionary expenses, such as extracurricular activities, must be cut in order to 
meet basic operating expenses.39  Once those programs are cut they fall out of the 
                                                                
31Id. at 533.  Justice Resnick’s concurring opinion states that:  
The Chief Justice [in his dissenting opinion] bemoans the fact that further litigation 
may be inevitable in light of the decision today, calling that possibility an ‘unfortunate 
eventuality.’  However, what the Chief Justice’s imperceptive view ignores is that as 
long as the General Assembly does not definitively fix the school-funding problem, 
which is its task alone, or at least make a realistic effort to do so, further litigation will 
be inevitable as a matter of course, since the court is the only body that definitively 
determines the constitutionality of laws.  
Id. (citations omitted). 
32Ohio Heading in Wrong Direction; Work Force Must be Educated for Jobs in New 
Economy, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Jan. 2, 2005, at B7 (quoting excerpts from a speech by U.S. 
Senator Mike DeWine, in which he asserts that  “[s]ince 2000, Ohio has lost more jobs than 
any other state – a quarter million or 37 percent of all jobs lost nationwide”).  
33O’Donnell, supra note 2. 
34Id.   
35Byard, Ohio-area Schools Hope Presidential Election Brings Votes for Funding, supra 
note 3.  
36Byard, Akron, Ohio, Area’s School-Tax Pass Rate is Average, supra note 3. 
37Byard, Wayne County, Ohio, Teachers, Administrators Won’t Take Raises Amid Budget 
Woes Teachers Wont Take Raises, supra note 3. 
38Id.; Geneva, supra note 20.  
39Geneva, supra note 20. 
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general budget and it becomes increasingly difficult and costly for the school to re-
institute them.40  In this way a school district’s resources are whittled away levy by 
levy, until the district is incapable of providing anything more than a bread-and-
water education. 
III.  EDUCATION AND THE OHIO CONSTITUTION 
Both the text and the history of the Ohio Constitution’s education clause reveal 
that, as the Ohio Supreme Court declared in DeRolph, Ohio must do more than 
provide a bread-and-water education.  The Ohio Constitution requires that “[t]he 
general assembly shall . . . secure a thorough and efficient system of common 
schools throughout the state . . . .”41  The use of the word “shall” here should not be 
overlooked.  It clearly indicates that the framers of the Ohio Constitution of 1851 
intentionally placed an affirmative duty on the Ohio General Assembly to provide for 
public schools.  As the following discussion will demonstrate, the framers 
understood the term “common schools” to have a well-defined and particular 
meaning: i.e., free, universal, public schools dedicated to fostering democratic 
citizens for the good of society.42   
Recognition of the importance of universal education is part of the nation’s 
founders’ ideal of national democracy as well as Ohio’s state legacy.  People like 
George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, Noah 
Webster, and Benjamin Rush wrote about the crucial role education would play in a 
successful republic.43  Each of these men understood that a well-educated citizen has 
a fundamental role in a democratic republic and that it was the responsibility of 
government to promote enlightened citizenship.  Thus, an understanding of 
education as a benefit to society at large as opposed to only the individual has always 
been part of the American ideology.44  Ohio history clearly illustrates the strength 
and prevalence of this notion of democracy and education, further demonstrating its 
importance as a first principle in discussing contemporary school reform 
movements.45   
This section briefly addresses early national conceptions of universal education 
and the subsequent Common School movement in order to put the Ohio 
Constitution’s particular approach to education in its broader context.  It then 
discusses education and the history of the Ohio Constitution and analyzes the 
meaning of the education clauses in the Constitution of 1851, the basis of our current 
Constitution.   
                                                                
40Id. 
41OHIO CONST. OF 1851, art. VI, § 2 (emphasis added). 
42See generally O’Brien & Woodrum, supra note 12.  The article by O’Brien & Woodrum 
is a key reference for the section on the constitutional history of education in Ohio.   
431 SUSAN C. HASTINGS ET AL., BALDWIN’S OHIO SCHOOL LAW, 1-2 (2003); Carl F. 
Kaestle, Pillars of the Republic:  Common Schools and American Society, 1780-1860 5-9 
(1983). 
44KAESTLE, supra note 43, at 5-9. 
45See generally O’Brien & Woodrum, supra note 12. 
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A.  Notions of Universal Education in the Early Republic 
In his farewell address in 1796, George Washington said, “[p]romote, then, as an 
object of primary importance, institutions for the general diffusion of knowledge.  In 
proportion as the structure of a government gives force to public opinion, it is 
essential that public opinion should be enlightened.”46  Recognition of the unique and 
central role of the public in republican government led logically and directly to the 
promotion of education urged here by Washington.47  On the same grounds, John 
Adams argued for government sponsorship of universal education:  “The whole 
people must take upon themselves the education of the whole people, and must be 
willing to bear the expenses of it.”48  Perhaps the “founding father” most famous for 
advocating for universal education. is Thomas Jefferson. 49  In his frequently cited 
book on the history of American education, Carl Kaestle writes:   
In the preamble of his 1779 bill for free schools in Virginia, Thomas 
Jefferson laid out the basic logic of state-sponsored schools for republican 
citizenship.  Citizens must choose leaders wisely, defeat ambition and 
corruption in politics, and protect liberty by keeping a vigilant eye on 
government.  All citizens should have a chance not only to vote but to be 
elected.  The government needs wise and honest laws, Jefferson argued, 
and thus it needs educated and virtuous lawmakers.  In a republic, these 
men must be chosen ‘without regard to wealth, birth or other accidental 
condition.’  Because there are many people who cannot afford a good 
education, Jefferson argued, all should share the cost, in order to foster the 
best possible representative government.50 
Jefferson unequivocally connected citizenship with education, and viewed the state 
society as the beneficiary of an educated citizenry.  Since education served an 
essential (and essentially) civic purpose, Jefferson believed that it was the state’s 
responsibility to provide that education.51 
                                                                
46HASTINGS, supra note 43, at 1. 
47KAESTLE, supra note 43, at 5.   
48HASTINGS, supra note 43, at 2. 
49One could speculate that there are two potential reasons for this – first, his eloquent and 
prolific writing influences researchers to turn to him first for the founders’ approach to any 
given topic, and second, he proposed a plan for universal public education in Virginia.  With 
the exception of Benjamin Rush, none of the other founders attempted to materialize universal 
education to that extent.  KAESTLE, supra note 43, at 6-9 (citing Thomas Jefferson, Bill for the 
More General Diffusion of Knowledge (1779)).  
50KAESTLE, supra note 43, at 6 (citations omitted). 
51Molly O’Brien, Free at Last? Charter Schools and the “Deregulated” Curriculum, 34 
AKRON L. REV. 137, 141 (2000). 
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B.  Common Schools 
It was not until the middle of the nineteenth century, however, that the ideal of 
universal public education actually came to fruition,52 in the form of the “Common 
School.”53  The Common School movement began in Massachusetts and spread 
throughout the midwestern states and territories.  Its chief proponent was Horace 
Mann, Superintendent of Massachusetts Common Schools in 1837, and a national 
voice articulating the Common School ideology and advocating for the spread of 
Common Schools.54  That is, ‘common’ in the sense of universally available to all 
classes of people–recalling Jefferson’s words above, “without regard to wealth, birth 
or other accidental condition.”55  The Common School ideology followed Jefferson 
and his colleagues’ logic that universal education plays a central role in a republican 
society.  In a nation of immigrants, pioneers, and entrepreneurs, the Common School 
“would bring together diverse groups of classes and people; it would be the engine of 
social mobility and economic opportunity; it would produce virtuous citizens for 
self-government.”56  In addition, national identity, patriotism, and a set of shared 
values—at the time based in Protestantism—would promote the success of the 
republic by creating an affinity among citizens.57  Common School proponents 
argued that enlightened national and state citizenship could only develop through the 
mechanism of Common Schools.  Furthermore, the Common School advocates 
popularized “the view that education was an economic benefit to the entire 
community.”58  They argued that education is a public benefit because republican 
society in general is better served by an enlightened electorate. 
The Common School movement in Ohio began in 1829.59  The movement began 
as a grassroots effort by a teachers’ organization but gained momentum with the 
appointment of Samuel Lewis as the first Superintendent of Common Schools in 
1837.  Lewis adhered to the Common School ideology popularized by Horace Mann 
                                                                
52Jefferson’s and Rush’s plans for universal public schooling in Virginia and Pennsylvania 
respectively did not succeed in the state legislatures of the early republican period.  KAESTLE, 
supra note 43, at 8-9.   
53See generally, KAESTLE, supra note 43.  Kaestle’s book is dedicated to the history of the 
Common School movement, including its ideological foundation in the early republic.  It is a 
detailed and very frequently referenced work. See, e.g., O’Brien, supra note 51; Kagan, supra 
note 19; MARIS A. VINOVSKIS, EDUCATION, SOCIETY, AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY:  A 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON PERSISTENT ISSUES (1995). 
54See KAESTLE, supra note 43, at 75; O’Brien & Woodrum, supra note 12, at 599.   
55O’Brien & Woodrum, supra note 12, at 599. 
56Id. 
57See KAESTLE, supra note 43, at 75 (discussing in great detail the ideology underpinning 
the common school movement in the chapter entitled, “The Ideology of Antebellum Common-
School Reform”).  Kaestle says that the ideology of common schools had three primary 
sources:  republicanism, Protestantism, and capitalism.  Id. 
58VINOVSKIS, supra note 53, at 92.  
59See generally O’Brien & Woodrum, supra note 12.  O’Brien and Woodrum’s article, 
The Constitutional Common School, traces the development of common schools in Ohio in 
considerable detail. Id. 
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2005
478 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:467 
in the eastern United States, and traveled the state giving speeches promoting 
Common Schools and lobbying state legislators.60  With the assistance of the 
teachers’ organization and a commissioned report on education in Europe by 
prominent Ohio citizen and Professor Calvin Stowe, the ideology of common 
schooling took root in Ohio.61  As a result, the ideology of the Common School was 
the prevailing public and political opinion in 1850 at the time of the Ohio 
Constitutional Convention, and it became the basis of the education clauses in the 
resulting Constitution.62 
C.  Ohio Education Clause 
The Ohio Constitution of 1851, however, was not the first of Ohio’s foundational 
documents to reference universal education.  Article III of the Northwest Ordinance 
stated that “schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged.”63  Like 
other progressive ideas (e.g., abolitionism64) that found expression in the Northwest 
Ordinance before they were manifested in the established state governments or the 
fragile federal government, this “encouragement” clause expressed the enlightened 
founders’ view of the role of education in a republic.  Predictably, it was repeated in 
Ohio’s first constitution, the Constitution of 1802.65  In addition, the Bill of Rights of 
                                                                
60Id. 
61Id.  Calvin Stowe was a relative of author Harriet Beecher Stowe.  His report, 
commissioned by the Ohio General Assembly, supported the common school rationale 
advanced by Superintendent Lewis and the national common school movement.  Stowe argued 
that creating a sense of national identity would bring the diverse population together around a 
set of shared ideals.  He “asserted that education was also the way to avoid the ‘evils of an 
ignorant and unbridled democracy.’”  Id. at 601.  O’Brien & Woodrum speculate that this 
particular view arose out of the election of populist Andrew Jackson as President.  Id.   
62Id. at 611.  O’Brien & Woodrum state that “by 1849 public sentiment in favor of free 
universal public schooling was strong.” Id.  They go on to point out that, during the 
Constitutional Convention,  
debates on the specific wording of the provisions were lively.  Notably, however, the 
education activists had succeeded in capturing the rhetorical high ground.  In every 
session, the idea that an education ought to be provided to every child in the state was 
assumed.  Free common schooling was presented and accepted as a matter of 
patriotism, economic urgency, and democratic necessity. 
Id. at 612. 
63ORDINANCE OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORY (1787), art. III.  “Religion, morality, and 
knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and 
the means of education shall forever be encouraged.”  Id.   
64Article VI of the Northwest Ordinance states that “there shall be neither slavery nor 
involuntary servitude in the said territory.”  Id.  The United States Constitution, crafted the 
same year, explicitly protected slavery for a period of years for fear that doing otherwise 
would make ratification impossible.   
65OHIO CONST. OF 1802, art. VIII, § 25. 
That no law shall be passed to prevent the poor in the several counties and townships 
within this state from an equal participation in the schools, academies, colleges and 
universities within this state, which are endowed, in whole or in part, from the revenue 
arising from donations made by the United States, for the support of schools and 
colleges; and the doors of the said schools, academies, and universities, shall be open 
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the Ohio Constitution of 1802 guaranteed access to schools supported by the state 
fund, regardless of wealth or social class.66 
1.  The “Thorough and Efficient” Clause 
In light of the Common School movement, the Ohio Constitution of 1851 treated 
education in unprecedented detail and fundamentally shifted the state’s official 
posture toward a state system of public education from encouragement to guarantee.  
The debate in the Constitutional Convention produced the “thorough and efficient” 
clause that remains the central clause related to public education.  
The general assembly shall make such provisions, by taxation, or 
otherwise, as, with the income arising from the school trust fund, will 
secure a thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout the 
State; but no religious or other sect, or sects, shall ever have any exclusive 
right to, or control of, any part of the school funds of this state.67 
Although the delegates to the convention debated various relevant issues such as the 
role of religion in public schools, the extent of the curriculum in the “fancy 
branches,” the funding system, and the branch of government entrusted with 
responsibility for the schools, not once did they question the appropriateness of 
universal, tax-supported public education under the Common School model.68   
Instead, there were numerous statements and debates centered on the necessity of 
prioritizing universal public education and ensuring its viability into the future based 
on a fundamental belief that it would benefit the state.  For example, Delegate 
Samuel Quigley said: 
The great and important business of securing a general education, and of 
conducting a well regulated system of common schools, requires 
perseverance, energy, and vigilance . . . .  The language of this section is 
expressive of the liberality worthy of a great State, and a great people.  
There is no stopping place short of a common school education to all the 
children in the State . . . . Intelligence is the foundation-stone upon which 
this mighty republic rests–its future depends upon the impulse, the action 
of the present generation in the promotion of literature.69  
Emphasizing the importance of an education clause that would ensure the 
necessity of future generations to make improvements in the public school system, 
                                                          
 
for the reception of scholars, students and teachers, of every grade, without any 
distinction or preference whatever, contrary to the intent for which said donations 
were made.   
Id. See also O’Brien & Woodrum, supra note 12, at 593. 
66Id. at 594 (noting that this clause was not interpreted as guaranteeing access to state 
funded schools independent of race). 
67OHIO CONST. OF 1851, art. VI, § 2 (emphasis added). 
68O’Brien & Woodrum, supra note 12, at 693. 
69Report of the Debates and Proceedings of the Convention for the Revision of the 
Constitution of the State of Ohio, 1850-51 14-15 [hereinafter Debates of 1850-51].  
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Delegate Archibold suggested replacing the word “common” with the word “useful” 
in that “[h]e wanted to see a system of schools as perfect as could be devised . . . .”70  
Delegate J. McCormick made it clear that the requirement of the legislature should 
be unequivocal; that encouragement should give way to constitutional command.   
Under the old Constitution it is provided that public schools and the cause 
of education shall be forever encouraged; and, under this constitutional 
provision, we have trusted the General Assembly for forty-eight years; 
and we may trust them for forty-eight years longer, without any good 
result . . . . Our system of common schools, instead of improving in 
legislative hands, has been degenerating; and I think it is time that we 
establish and carry out an efficient system of common school 
education . . . .71 
Finally, the discussion of race and education at the convention debates reveals the 
delegates’ commitment to the notion that education is a public benefit.  When 
Delegate William Sawyer proposed an amendment that free education be provided 
only to white children, he was rebuked on both moral and practical grounds.  On the 
practical side, Delegate Taylor argued in response that it would be unwise to leave 
anyone, black or white, under-educated because an under-educated person is a 
burden on the state.   
I knew that this Convention was not prepared to increase the political 
rights of the black man; but I had hoped that all were willing to provide 
against his becoming the pest of society, by being deprived of all 
opportunities for education.  Shall we not secure protection to ourselves 
and our children by relieving the colored population of Ohio, from the 
absolute necessity of growing up in vice and ignorance?72 
There are blatantly racist overtones to the dialogue; however, it illustrates the 
Common School ideology of education as an essential component of a republican 
society that should, therefore, be provided by the state. 
Thus, the famous “thorough and efficient” clause arose out of the Common 
School movement to become an enduring part of the Ohio Constitution.73 
                                                                
70Id. at 698.  As summarized by the Convention reporter,  
[h]e hoped to see common schools advance, not only to meet such demands as are 
now made upon them, but to meet higher and greater requisitions.  Then the common 
of the future will need to be far above the common of the present.  He wanted to see a 
system of schools as perfect as could be devised, and to see it improve so as to keep 
pace with the most rapid progress of the most rapid element of our social or political 
constitution.   
Id. 
71Id. at 702. 
72Id. at 11. 
73O’Brien & Woodrum, supra note 12, at 616 (“[T]he vision of schooling that would be 
incorporated into the Constitution was the common school ideal:  universal, free, non-sectarian 
education for self-government, enlightenment, and economic advancement.”).  In addition to 
the “thorough and efficient” clause of Article VI, § 2, the Ohio Constitution also addresses 
education in Article VI, § 3 and Article XII, § 5.  Article VI, § 3 provides for local control of 
city school districts through elected school boards.  Article XII, § 5 requires the state to 
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IV.  PRIVATIZATION 
Ohio has not been assertive in finding funds to fulfill its affirmative duty to 
provide a thorough and efficient Common School education as mandated by the 
Ohio Constitution.  In fact, Governor Taft’s February 2005 state budget proposal 
called for “ship[ping] more money to private schools,” but proposed little assistance 
for struggling public schools.74  Many observers and commentators speculate that the 
reason for this has to do with a conservative national and state agenda toward the 
privatization of government programs.75  Since education is the largest line item in 
the state budget it is a prime candidate for privatization efforts.76  
With this in mind, the current legal battle over Ohio’s community schools pits 
generally conservative advocates of privatization against supporters of traditional 
public schools reflecting the Common School ideal.77  Community schools have 
become a battlefield in this ideological war because of their particular characteristics:  
community schools are “public” schools funded with public dollars but exempt from 
                                                          
 
disclose the purpose of a state tax in order for that tax to be valid.  Although not exclusively an 
educational provision, this clause is relevant to the claim that Ohio charter schools are in fact 
partially supported by local tax dollars but nominally entirely supported by state funds.  See 
infra § VI.  
74See Theis, supra note 5 (“While [Governor] Taft’s budget attempts to ship more money 
to private schools, he’s calling for only slight increases for public schools, many of which are 
in districts that continue to seek tax increases to avoid cuts in personnel and programs.”). 
75Doug Oplinger and Dennis J. Willard, School Battle Eludes Voters, Takes Its Cues from 
Coalitions:  Powerful Organizations Turn Education into a War of Words, Litigation and 
Money, THE AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, Dec. 15, 1999, at A1.  In their series of articles on 
privatization in education in Ohio, Oplinger and Willard discuss the various lobbyists and 
special interest groups vying for control over educational policy in Ohio.  They suggest that, 
with the elections of Republican Governors George Voinovich and Bob Taft, the “school 
choice” movement associated with privatization has received considerable executive support 
and definitely has the upper hand.  Id.  The privatization movement in Ohio has also been 
recognized by the national press.  See Sam Dillon, Voters to Decide on Charter Schools, THE 
NEW YORK TIMES, Oct. 25, 2004, at A15 (quoting Western Michigan University researcher 
Gary Miron stating that Ohio charter schools “are very much about privatization”).  The 
privatization agenda is also readily apparent in the current debate over Social Security.  The 
essence of President Bush’s Social Security plan is privatization, and the administration seems 
unabashed in saying so. 
76See Ohio Department of Education, FY 2004 – FY 2005 Operating Budget Analysis 109 
at http://www.lbo.state.oh.us/fiscal/budget/FiscalAnalysis/125GA/EDU.pdf (last visited Aug. 
31, 2005) [hereinafter FY 2004 – FY 2005 Operating Budget Analysis]; see also generally 
Julie Huston Vallarelli, Note, State Constitutional Restraints on the Privatization of 
Education, 72 B.U. L. REV. 381 (1992). 
77See State of Ohio ex rel. Ohio Congress of Parents and Teachers v. State Of Ohio Bd. of 
Educ., No. 03AP-508, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 4009. See also Charter School Foes Appeal 
Court Ruling, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, Oct. 13, 2004, at A5; Jennifer Smith Richards, 
Charter Schools Focus of 3rd Suit, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, June 10, 2004, at 1C. 
15Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2005
482 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:467 
many state laws and regulations applicable to traditional public schools.78  They are 
often owned and/or operated by for-profit entities.79  
Based on this, community school opponents argue that community schools 
violate the Ohio Constitution by diverting public funds to private beneficiaries, 80  
and that, in practice, community schools do not aid in equalizing educational 
opportunity for all – the goal of Ohio’s “Constitutional Common School.”81   
Many community school proponents respond that there is nothing inherently 
wrong with privatization and that it will improve public schooling and equal 
opportunity through school choice, economic efficiency, and competition among 
local schools.82   
                                                                
78See State ex rel. Ohio Congress of Parents and Teachers, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 4009, 
at *2. 
79Willard & Oplinger, Charter Experiment Goes Awry, supra note 4.  Under the heading 
“EMOs Dominate,” the authors note that the original conception of charter schools in 
Minnesota did not include for-profit enterprises but instead focused on a blend of innovative 
pedagogy and community involvement.  However,  
[n]ow education management companies [EMOs] dominate the charter school 
movement. . . . [Seventy] percent of the charter schools in [Michigan] were run by 
EMOs during the 1998-99 school year, up from 50 percent the year before. . . . In 
Ohio . . . EMOs control 45 percent of the state and local funds [allocated to charter 
schools] and enroll 46% of the students. 
Id.  The most recent study of Ohio charter schools indicates that influence of EMOs continues 
to increase.  Alexander Russo, A Tough Nut to Crack in Ohio:  Charter Schooling in the 
Buckeye State 5 (February, 2005), available at www.ppionline.org/documents/ 
Ohioreport_0201.pdf (last visited Aug. 31, 2005).  As of 2004, “[s]ixty-six percent of charter 
school students in Ohio attend schools run by education management organizations; 25 
percent of charter school students [were] enrolled in [cyberschools] . . . .”  Id. 
80At the heart of the plaintiffs’ claims is the assertion that aid to community schools 
deprives the local school district in which the community school sits of state funds.  See State 
ex rel. Ohio Congress of Parents and Teachers, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 4009, at *22-23.  This 
claim is hotly contested by the state and by charter school advocates.  See, e.g., Terry Ryan, 
Setting the Record Straight on Ohio Charter Schools, THE EDUCATION GADFLY, July 7, 2005, 
Vol. 5, No. 24, http://www.edexcellence.net/institute/gadfly/issue.cfm?id=199#2375.  Crucial 
to the inquiry is the fact that state money follows the child from the traditional school district 
to the community school, and the claim that the state deducts from the funds it gives to the 
district more per community school pupil than it provides per-pupil in state aid.  See Charter 
School Tiff Not for the Courts, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, June 18, 2004, at A12.  Therefore, the 
state is essentially shifting local funds to community schools or reducing the state funds per-
pupil.  Furthermore, economies of scale make it difficult for public schools designed to serve a 
certain number of students to serve less students at the same cost.  See PEARL ROCK KANE & 
CHRISTOPHER J. LAURICELLA, ASSESSING THE GROWTH AND POTENTIAL OF CHARTER SCHOOLS 
in PRIVATIZING EDUCATION:  CAN THE MARKETPLACE DELIVER CHOICE, EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, 
AND SOCIAL COHESION? 203, 228 (Henry M. Levin ed., Westview Press 2001) (noting that “it 
costs as much to run a class for twenty-one students as it does for twenty-six”). 
81O’Brien & Woodrum, supra note 12, at 586. 
82See, e.g., BRENNAN, DAVID L., VICTORY FOR KIDS:  THE CLEVELAND SCHOOL VOUCHER 
CASE (Brown, Cynthia, ed., New Millennium Press 2002). 
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Both positions are vulnerable to theoretical and statistical attack.83  The Ohio 
Constitution, however, supports the community school opponents’ position:  The 
Ohio Constitution is fundamentally incompatible with the privatization aspects of 
Ohio’s community school laws.  Therefore, it is essential to understand privatization 
theory, and the ways in which privatization manifests itself in Ohio community 
schools. 
A.  Privatization Theory in Education 
The word “privatization” entered the lexicon remarkably recently, perhaps as a 
result of the decline of communism.84  Literally, “to privatize” means “to turn over (a 
public property, service, etc.) to private interests.”85  Although privatization is now a 
powerful and prevailing global movement, in the United States it began overtly with 
the Reagan administration’s emphasis on the importance of small government and 
decentralization of government services.86  As one of the primary government 
programs of the states, education quickly became part of the privatization 
discussion.87  According to Henry M. Levin, Director of the nonpartisan National 
Center for the Study of Privatization in Education (NCSPE), national educational 
policy is currently moving increasingly toward decentralized solutions and market 
ideology (i.e., privatization).88  Levin defines privatization in education as “the 
establishment of schools operated by non-governmental authorities, whether for 
profit or not-for-profit.”89   
                                                                
83LEVIN, supra note 10, at 4 (stating that there is little constructive discourse on 
privatization between adherents and detractors, “[e]ach side tends to elaborate, and often, to 
overstate its position and exaggerate the strength of the evidence supporting its stance”).  Mr. 
Levine’s organization, the National Center for the Study of Privatization in Education 
(NCSPE), is specifically designed to be a nonpartisan and neutral research organization.  See 
NCSPE, available at www.ncspe.org (“The center provides independent, non-partisan 
information on and analysis of privatization in education.”). 
84SAMUEL FLAM & WILLIAM KEANE, PUBLIC SCHOOLS, PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 15 (Rowman 
& Littlefield Pub. Inc. 1997) (stating that research identified no dictionary entries for the word 
prior to 1983).   
85WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1143 (4th ed. 2000). 
86FLAM & KEANE, supra note 84, at 16.  In fact, President Reagan commissioned the 
President’s Commission on Privatization in 1983 to study and promote privatization of 
government services.  Id. at 17.  See also Barbara Miner, For Profits Target Education, in 
EDUCATION, INC.:  TURNING LEARNING INTO A BUSINESS 131, 137 (Alfie Kohn & Patrick 
Shannon eds., 2002). 
87FLAM & KEANE, supra note 84, at 14. 
88Levin, supra note 10, at 3. See also Henry A. Giroux, Schools for Sale:  Public 
Education, Corporate Culture, and the Citizen-Consumer in EDUCATION, INC.: TURNING 
LEARNING INTO A BUSINESS 101, 106-07 (Alfie Kohn & Patrick Shannon eds., Heinemann 
2002); MICHAEL ENGEL, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF PUBLIC EDUCATION:  MARKET 
IDEOLOGY VS. DEMOCRATIC VALUES 3 (2000).   
89Levin, supra note 10, at 4-5. 
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1.  The Market Ideology90 Underlying Privatization 
The basic rationale behind privatizing education is that the free market can 
deliver a higher quality education at a lower cost than the government because of the 
inefficiency inherent in government bureaucracy.91  Privatization advocates argue 
that public education is a wholly bureaucratic institution; that bureaucracies are slow 
to change, and therefore the status quo overwhelms the wishes of parents, students, 
or other interested parties who attempt to advocate for educational reform.92  
Proponents of privatization view the free market as value-neutral, promoting 
efficiency, results-oriented change, and natural responsiveness to primary 
stakeholders’ needs.  They favor privatization as a market-based alternative to 
“government schools.”93  Parents and students, the consumers of education, are best 
situated to know what they want from a school, in fact do know what they want and 
will choose to optimize the return on their investment; therefore, private companies 
competing for students have every incentive to deliver the highest quality education 
at the lowest possible price.94  These incentives, argue market adherents, simply do 
not exist in the non-competitive, monopolistic government system of public 
education.  Therefore, it is not surprising that schools are failing; they have no built-
in incentive to succeed and have the ball-and-chain of bureaucracy to hold them 
back.95    
Privatization advocates also argue that the same incentives address educational 
consumers’ (i.e. parents’ and students’) moral and social needs without privatization 
itself being a value-based system.96  These needs, like academic and vocational 
considerations, are simply factored into the rational decision consumers make in the 
                                                                
90Noted educational historian Carl Kaestle defines “ideology” as follows:   
[A] set of apparently compatible propositions about human nature and society that 
help an individual interpret complex human problems and take action that the 
individual believes is in his or her best interest and the best interest of the society as a 
whole.  Ideology is the aspect of culture that attempts to justify and defend a set of 
social relations and institutions. 
KAESTLE, supra note 43, at 76.  
91Numerous commentators, politicians, and social scientists argue that applying market 
theory to education will ultimately improve it and therefore justify privatization.  The most 
often quoted study was conducted by John Chubb and Terry Moe in 1990.  JOHN CHUBB & 
TERRY MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA’S SCHOOLS (1990).  Many other authors on 
both sides of the issue discuss and summarize the market ideology.  See, e.g., R. David Walk, 
Jr., Counterpoint:  How Educational Management Companies Serve Charter Schools and 
their Students, 32 J.L. & EDUC. 241 (2003) (arguing in favor of privatization); SMITH, supra 
note 10, at 5 (arguing against privatization but citing Chubb & Moe’s argument that public 
education is bureaucratic, rule-based, and mired in mediocrity because bureaucracy is 
inherently inefficient and traditional public schooling concentrates power in the bureaucracy).   
92SMITH, supra note 10, at 5. 
93Id. at 2 (noting that privatization advocates began to refer to traditional public schools as 
“government schools,” and that they use it as a pejorative term). 
94Id. at 4 (calling this “public choice theory” and discussing it in some detail).   
95CHUBB & MOE, supra note 91, at 186. 
96SMITH, supra note 10, at 2. 
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school choice marketplace.  Thus, the market ideology underlying privatization 
presents a unified theory for universal education in which each individual parent 
and/or student gets the services they need from state funds distributed to private 
educators.  However, as this Note will discuss below in sections IV-VI, opponents of 
privatization, and the Ohio Constitution, take a fundamentally different approach to 
education that challenges the coherence of the market ideology underlying 
privatization. 
2.  The Dimensions of Privatization:  Economic, Political, and Social 
Privatization of education exists on several levels, some more obvious than 
others.97  The economic dimensions of privatization are the most apparent.  
Transferring responsibility for public education from government agencies to private 
entities means shifting control of tax dollars from the public to private sector.98  The 
government will maintain a minimal regulatory influence, but market considerations, 
as opposed to political considerations, will predominantly govern the use of the 
funds.99  Similarly, the political aspects of privatization are not difficult to recognize.  
Policy considerations are fundamental to the extent to which states privatize or 
maintain control of public education.  For example, if market ideology is the 
prevailing political philosophy in a state, then deregulation, volunteerism, and other 
forms of privatization will be more likely to find political support and occur.100   
The social dimensions of privatization are more subtle.  For example, when 
Coca-Cola contracts with a cash-strapped school district for the exclusive vending 
and advertising rights in all district schools, Coke is asserting a private (non-
nutritious) influence over district school children.101  “The curriculum therefore 
reflects the values of the groups in society who enjoy the power to promote their 
interests.”102  The power to influence students’ values in this way may be described 
                                                                
97Amy Stuart Wells & Janelle Scott, Privatization and Charter School Reform:  Economic, 
Political, and Social Dimensions in PRIVATIZING EDUCATION:  CAN THE MARKETPLACE 
DELIVER CHOICE, EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND SOCIAL COHESION? 234, 236 (Henry M. Levin ed., 
2001). 
98This applies to the varying degrees of privatization that might be accomplished by, for 
example, contracting out.  That is, governments privatize an aspect of education when it 
contracts with a private company to provide a specific, limited service, such as transportation.  
Educational Management Companies, or “EMOs” are a more complete form of privatization 
via contracting in which the government contracts with a private company to manage all 
aspects of a school.  Id. at 235.   
99See, e.g., Walk, supra note 91, at 243; WELLS & SCOTT, supra note 97, at 236 
(discussing privatization advocates and their theories); BRUCE FULLER, THE PUBLIC SQUARE, 
BIG OR SMALL?:  CHARTER SCHOOLS IN POLITICAL CONTEXT in INSIDE CHARTER SCHOOLS:  THE 
PARADOX OF RADICAL DECENTRALIZATION 18-19 (Bruce Fuller ed. 2000) (summarizing Chubb 
& Moe’s position regarding market forces, bureaucracy, and education).    
100WELLS & SCOTT, supra note 97, at 236.  “Volunteerism” refers to voluntary 
organizations providing a service that government agencies traditionally provide.  Id.  For 
example, religious organizations that provide shelter for the homeless engage in volunteerism.   
101ALFIE KOHN, WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE WELL EDUCATED? AND MORE ESSAYS ON 
STANDARDS, GRADING, AND OTHER FOLLIES 15 (2004). 
102O’Brien, supra note 51, at 146.   
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as a form of social capital.  Different schools’ comparative access to private sources 
of social capital is a form of social privatization.103  More specifically, schools’ 
ability to raise funds from private donors, dependence on those funds, selective 
marketing to sort out needy students, or the probability of finding uniquely skilled 
local volunteers is privatization to the extent that it allows non-governmental entities 
to exercise control over government services.  These social dimensions of 
privatization should not be ignored because they may significantly affect the 
practical likelihood that privatization can deliver on the promise of equal educational 
opportunity for all children that is at the heart of the Ohio Constitution.104 
B.  Basic Types of Educational Privatization 
Total adherence to the market theory discussed above would mean that education 
would not be public at all and would have to be purchased.105  Therefore, all 
mainstream proposals to privatize education include public funds channeled to 
private service-providers.  There are, however, different types and varying degrees of 
privatization that are worth identifying and loosely categorizing.   
There are two main categories of privatization in education, which this Note will 
refer to as “state non-public aid” and “state sponsorship.”  First, state non-public aid 
describes when the government maintains control of education but provides private 
institutions with funds to reimburse them for taking on a portion of the state’s 
responsibility for public schooling.106  State non-public aid includes the transfer of 
state funds to non-public schools for the benefit of children in the non-public schools 
for certain services and supplies.  Examples include busing, supplies such as 
textbooks, and administrative assistance.107  Second, state sponsorship occurs when 
the government acts to shift some or all of its responsibility to provide a public 
education onto a private entity.  State sponsorship consists primarily of contracting 
out,108 Educational Management Organizations (EMOs),109 vouchers,110 tax credits,111 
and, most relevant to this Note, charter schools.112   
                                                                
103WELLS & SCOTT, supra note 98, at 236. 
104Id.  
105SMITH, supra note 10, at 6. 
106A historical note illustrates the sea change in the relationship between public and 
private schooling during this century.  In the first half of the century, the public school ideal 
was so strong that the state of Oregon attempted to require not only that all students attend 
school, but that all students attend a public school.  Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 
(1924).  The U.S. Supreme Court invalidated this law, upholding parents’ right to choose to 
send their children to non-public schools.  Id.  However, the case is indicative of the profound 
difference between the state practically attempting to eliminate private schools and the state 
providing monetary aid to private schools. 
107See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.06 (LexisNexis 2004).  This section is entitled:  
Payments for providing textbooks, services, and educational equipment to students at non-
public schools.  Id.  
108A public school district contracting with a private company to provide some aspect of 
the educational program is probably the most common form of privatization.  For example, a 
small school district might contract with a landscaping company to mow its lawns rather than 
establish its own grounds department.  Frank R. Kemerer, The Legal Status of Privatization 
and Vouchers in Education in PRIVATIZING EDUCATION:  CAN THE MARKETPLACE DELIVER 
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The distinction between these two types of privatization is most useful as a 
descriptive device, but also marks the stages in the expansion of privatization efforts 
in education.  While state non-public aid has been part of many states’ systems of 
public education for decades, state sponsorship, particularly the more extensive 
forms such as vouchers, EMOs, and charter schools, is a relatively recent 
development that corresponds with the larger movement toward privatizing 
government services. 
C.  History of Educational Privatization in Ohio 
In the last decade, Ohio has had the distinction of leading the nation in the first 
privatization category: aid to non-public schools.113  This ranking is indicative of 
Ohio’s political attention to privatization efforts since the administration of former 
Governor and current U.S. Senator George Voinovich.114  In fact, many journalists, 
politicians, school administrators, and observers speculate both on and off the record 
that there is a concerted political effort to privatize Ohio’s schools.115  Whether or not 
the trend is by design, it is a simple fact that Ohio has enacted significant 
privatization legislation in the past several decades.   
                                                          
 
CHOICE, EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND SOCIAL COHESION? 39, 40 (Henry M. Levin ed., 2001) 
(“School districts routinely contract with private organizations to provide such services as bus 
transportation, meals, maintenance, and special education for severely disabled children”). 
109Educational Management Organizations (“EMOs”) are companies that specialize in 
contracting to manage all or most of the aspects of a public school.  For obvious reasons, 
EMOs might be thought of as simply the most extensive version of contracting out.  FLAM & 
KEANE, supra note 85, at 162. 
110
“[A]n instrument used for the transfer of public funds to a person, program, school, or 
business that educates students in a setting other than a public school.”  Id. at 164.  Cleveland, 
Ohio (along with Milwaukee, Wisconsin) served as a national testing ground for educational 
vouchers.  The state provided an educational voucher for urban students to use at a qualified 
private school of their choice.  See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (finding 
the Cleveland voucher program constitutional under the U.S. Constitution).  See also Theis, 
supra note 5 (discussing the current expansion of the Ohio Voucher program proposed by 
Governor Taft in his February 2005 “State of the State” address). 
111See KEMERER, supra note 108, at 48-49.  
112See LEVIN, supra note 10, at 4. 
113See Willard & Oplinger, supra note 4. 
114Doug Oplinger & Dennis J. Willard, Voucher System Falls Far Short of Goals, AKRON 
BEACON JOURNAL, Dec. 14, 1999, at A1. 
115For example, Oplinger and Willard quote Ohio Senator Ben Espy, who said, 
“lawmakers have wondered for years why there was so much pressure from the executive 
branch and legislative leaders to fund vouchers and charter schools.”  Dennis J. Willard and 
Doug Oplinger, State Asked to Investigate Schools, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, Dec. 17, 1999, 
at C1.   In addition, Ohio public school funding coalition leaders Jayne Geneva and William 
Phillis explicitly state that they believe there is a concerted effort among Ohio politicians to 
privatize Ohio’s schools.  Geneva, supra note 20; Telephone Interview with William Phillis, 
Executive Director, Ohio Coalition for Equity and Adequacy in School Funding (Jan. 11, 
2005); see also supra note 1.   
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1.  State Aid to Non-Public Schools 
The first important wave of privatization legislation in Ohio occurred in the 
1960s and falls into the first privatization category discussed above–state non-public 
aid.116  In the late 1960s the state enacted legislation providing transportation for 
non-public school children.117  In 1975, the Ohio General Assembly enacted 
legislation approving expenditures for auxiliary services such as audiovisual 
equipment and required curricular items such as health textbooks for non-public 
schools.118  Additional legislation was enacted in 1982 providing non-public schools 
with state funds for administrative costs.119 This amount was then increased by fifty 
percent in 1996.120  Including transportation, auxiliary costs, administrative costs, 
and other various aid, by 1997 the state was giving over 125 million dollars to non-
public schools and, since 1974, had given almost 1.6 billion dollars in state aid.121   
                                                                
116RICHARD E. MAXWELL ET. AL., OHIO SCHOOL FINANCE:  A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 24 (2d 
ed. 1996).  Ohio was not the first and is far from the only state to provide monetary aid to non-
public schools.  See generally id. at 168-69.  The key case setting forth the rationale for 
providing state aid to non-public schools is Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 
281 U.S. 370 (1930).  In Cochran, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a law providing some state 
funding to non-public schools on the theory that the money was not technically benefiting the 
school, but actually benefited the children in the school.  281 U.S. 370.  Since these children 
would have been educated by the state but for their private school enrollment the Court found 
it reasonable to allow for state aid for their benefit.  This is known as the “child benefit 
theory.”  MAXWELL, at 169-70.  Notably, the Court in Cochran did not mandate such aid, it 
merely permitted it.  Id. at 169.    
117MAXWELL, supra note 116, at 169 (noting that no line item for this expense has ever 
been added to the State budget despite the fact that it is a significant expense borne solely by 
the state education budget).   
118Id.; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.06 (LexisNexis 1975).  In 1973 the Ohio General 
Assembly passed a similar, but less substantial, auxiliary services act that was struck down by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Wolman v. Essex, 421 U.S. 982 (1975).  MAXWELL, supra note 116, 
at 24.  The 1975 version was more deftly drafted and passed constitutional muster in Wolman 
v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).  Id.  
119
 MAXWELL, supra note 116, at 168-69. 
120MAXWELL, supra note 116, at 22, 168-69 (“Governor Voinovich is urging the expansion 
of Ohio’s contribution to non-public schools even though this state currently has one of the 
most extensive programs in the nation”).  See also Oplinger & Willard, supra note 115, 
describing in detail former Governor George Voinovich’s consistent efforts to increase aid to 
non-public schools and emphasizing his connections with Catholic bishops and Ohio parochial 
schools.  For example, Voinovich said:  “In many districts in the state, I suspect the non-public 
schools will be receiving a much greater increase in terms of state reimbursement than some 
public schools.”  Id.  In addition, the article notes EMO White Hat Management founder 
David Brennan’s relationship with Voinovich and quotes from a letter to Catholic Bishop 
Anthony Pilla written by Brennan:  “You are providing an opportunity for a lot of kids who 
wouldn’t ordinarily have a chance to have a good education, and we should really see if we 
can’t stimulate more state support for a non-public school system.”  Id.     
121MAXWELL, supra note 116, at 24. 
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In 1996, then Ohio Governor George Voinovich announced that Ohio was number 
one in the nation in providing aid to children in private schools.122   
2.  State Sponsorship of Privatization 
The second wave of privatization relates to state sponsorship and occurred in the 
1990s under Governors Voinovich and Taft.  Following the national and 
international trend toward privatization, conservative politicians and special interest 
groups in Ohio began aggressively advocating for “school choice” reforms of Ohio 
public schooling.123  The first of the major state sponsorship efforts in Ohio was the 
Cleveland voucher plan, while the second was state charter school legislation.   
a.  Educational Vouchers 
The idea of educational vouchers has a long history in the United States.124  
NCSPE director Henry Levin calls educational vouchers a radical development and 
defines them as “certificate[s] parents can use to pay all or a portion of tuition at any 
school that meets state guidelines for eligibility.”125  Most educational vouchers, 
including Cleveland’s, however, provide an amount that is less than the tuition of the 
private school, thus requiring parents to provide the remainder of tuition “as a 
gesture of sacrifice and shared responsibility.”126   
The voucher experiments in Cleveland, Ohio and Milwaukee, Wisconsin in the 
1990s were the first major test of the idea’s viability and constitutionality.127  The 
voucher experiment in Cleveland grew out of George Voinovich’s effort to reform 
Ohio’s schools during his first term as Governor and the recommendations of the 
Governor’s Commission on Educational Choice, appointed by Voinovich in 1992.128  
At the time, the Commission’s chairman, David Brennan, expressed views definitely 
favoring privatization ideology, indicating the connections between the “school 
choice” movement and privatization.  Brennan refers to public schools as 
“government schools,” and, in 1992, said of Ohio’s public schools, “[w]e have a 
system that would be the envy of Soviet Russia.  Total centralization . . . .”129 
                                                                
122Oplinger & Willard, supra note 114. 
123See Oplinger & Willard, supra note 75.   
124LEVIN, supra note 10, at 6 (noting Milton Friedman’s voucher plan in 1962).   
125Id. at 3.   
126Id. at 11. 
127Id. at 4.   
128BRENNAN, supra note 82, at 33.  The author, David Brennan, was the chairman of the 
Commission and is now the owner of White Hat Management, one of the largest EMOs in 
Ohio.  Doug Oplinger & Dennis J. Willard, Reading, Writing, Revenue—White Hat Continues 
its Rapid Expansion in the For-Profit Education Industry, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, Aug. 15, 
2005, at A1.     
129Oplinger & Willard, supra note 75.  The authors point out that David Brennan has 
continued to advocate for “school choice” on a national level.  In 1998, he gave a one 
thousand dollar campaign contribution to Tom Tancredo of Colorado, a United States 
Representative “who pledged to abolish public education.”  Id. See also Oplinger & Willard, 
supra note 128; Doug Oplinger & Dennis J. Willard, David Brennan’s White Hat 
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b.  Charter Schools; Ohio Community Schools 
Charter schools represent the other component of the state sponsorship wave of 
educational privatization legislation in Ohio.  In 1997, Ohio officially joined what 
commentators describe as the fastest growing form of school choice reform in the 
nation130 by enacting charter school legislation.131  Although Ohio was not one of the 
first states to enter the charter school arena, it has made up for a slow start with 
accelerated growth.  In fact, Ohio is now leading the nation by a wide margin in a 
variety of charter school known as “cyberschools” or “e-schools:” “schools in which 
students complete their coursework online using home computers.” 132  As of 
September 2004, according to Ohio Department of Education statistics, there were 
210 charter schools operating in the state, enrolling over 52,000 students.133  In 
addition, out of 44 states with charter school laws, Ohio’s is characterized as the 11th 
“strongest” by a leading charter school advocacy group because it leaves charter 
schools relatively unconstrained by government regulations.134  That is, Ohio charter 
                                                          
 
Management Changes the Way Business, Politics, and Educational Vouchers Mix, AKRON 
BEACON JOURNAL, Dec. 13, 1999, at A1. 
130O’Brien, supra note 52, at 152.   
131OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3314 (LexisNexis 2004). 
132Stephens, Ohio Virtually Booming with Cyber Schools, supra note 5.  One half of all of 
the cyberschools in the nation are located in Ohio.  E-mail from Jayne Geneva, Ohio Coalition 
of Equity and Adequacy in School Funding (Feb. 11, 2005, 3:45 EST) (on file with the 
author).  In 2003-2004, Ohio provided cyberschools with $290 million in state aid.  Id.  Many 
of the cyberschools are operated by for-profit EMOs.  Stephens, Ohio Virtually Booming with 
Cyber Schools0, supra note 5.  As of March, 2005, 48 of the 249 charter schools in Ohio were 
cyberschools, Doug Oplinger & Dennis J. Willard, Charter Schools Expansion Expensive, 
AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, Mar. 20, 2005, at A1, and 15,800 of the 62,000 charter school 
students in Ohio are enrolled in cyberschools.  Andrew Welsh-Huggins, E-Schools May Get 
New Rules, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, Mar. 15, 2005, at B5.   
133Russo, supra note 79, at 5 (citing Ohio Department of Education statistics).  More 
recent Ohio Department of Education data cited in newspaper articles indicates that “[a]bout 
63,000 students are enrolled in 249 charter schools this year (2005), receiving about $424 
million in state . . . tax dollars this year.”  Facts About Charter Schools in Ohio, AKRON 
BEACON JOURNAL, Mar. 24, 2005, at A6.  “Over the past five years, the number of charter 
schools in Ohio has nearly tripled from 68 to 249 while the number of students attending them 
has nearly quadrupled from 16,717 to 62,702.”  Jim Provance, Ohio Lawmakers Aim to Curb 
Growth of Charter Schools, THE TOLEDO BLADE, May 27, 2005, at A1.  This rapid expansion 
has caused some state legislators to advocate for slower or no charter school expansion 
recently.  Id.  In fact, State Senator Teresa Fedor, D-Toledo, recently initiated an investigation 
into the allegedly hasty and reckless approval of new charter schools by the Lucas County 
Educational Service Center.  See, e.g., Doug Oplinger & Dennis J. Willard, Charter Schools in 
Question—Official Approved at Least 78 Schools in 18 Months, Senator Says, AKRON BEACON 
JOURNAL, July 6, 2005, at B1.  
134THE CENTER FOR EDUCATION REFORM, CHARTER SCHOOL LAWS ACROSS THE STATES:  
RANKING AND SCORECARD 9 (8th ed. 2004), available at http://www.edreform.com/_ 
upload/charter_school_laws .pdf (last visited Aug. 31, 2005) [hereinafter CER Rankings].  The 
“strength” of a state’s charter school law, according to The Center for Education Reform, is 
basically inversely proportional to the restrictions placed on charter schools by the state; i.e., 
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schools are not subject to most of the various curricular and noncurricular mandates 
made to public schools by the state.135  This deregulation is a classic form of 
privatization in that it shifts control of a traditionally public responsibility to a 
private provider.   
The genesis of charter schools, however, has little to do with privatization.136  
One charter school opponent called Ohio community schools “a great idea . . . that 
has been hijacked by people whose idea is to privatize public education.”137  Ohio’s 
“strong” charter school laws are more apt to allow for-profit companies such as 
EMOs to become heavily involved, making charter schools a business.  In fact, 
EMOs make up almost half of Ohio charter schools and most of the state’s largest 
cyberschools are run by EMOs.138  In addition, as discussed later in further detail, 
Ohio charter schools also exhibit other more subtle dimensions of privatization such 
as market and social isolation from democratic citizenship and community goals.139 
                                                          
 
the more private in character the better.  The more schools allowed, the more chartering 
authorities available (particularly other than the local school board), the greater variety of 
charter applicants (including for-profit entities, etc.), the more new starts (as opposed to 
conversions of traditional public schools), the more restrictions and regulations that can be 
waived (compared to the regulations applicable to traditional public schools), and the more 
autonomous the schools are (contractually, fiscally, and legally), the stronger the law is.  
THOMAS L. GOOD & JENNIFER S. BRADEN, THE GREAT SCHOOL DEBATE:  CHOICE, VOUCHERS, 
AND CHARTERS 128 (2000).  Ohio has been rising in The Center for Education Reform’s 
rankings, probably indicating that the charter school laws in Ohio are getting stronger with 
subsequent revisions.  In December of 1998, Ohio had fifteen operating charter schools and its 
laws were rated twenty-third strongest.  The Center for Education Reform, Charter School 
Legislation:  State Rankings (1998) reprinted in GOOD & BRADEN at 29.  Thus, it has risen 
twelve slots in six years. 
135CER Rankings, supra note 134; Geneva, supra note 20. 
136Oplinger & Willard, supra note 4. 
137Russo, supra note 79, at 29 (quoting Ohio Federation of Teachers President Tom 
Mooney).   
138The for-profit nature of Ohio charter schools is now so prevalent that a recent article in 
a major Ohio newspaper defined charter schools as “for-profit schools that private groups 
began opening a decade ago with the help of local and state tax dollars.”  Stephanie Warsmith 
& Katie Byard, Losing Ground: Public School Enrollments Are Sinking in Ohio’s Big Cities 
as Residents Opt for Alternatives, Forcing Deep Budget Cuts, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, Jan. 
23, 2005, at A1.  This is simply incorrect, but it indicates the intimate connection between 
charter schools and privatization in Ohio.  Public perception has shifted from viewing charter 
schools as innovative public schools to viewing them as private, market-based alternatives to 
traditional public schools.  See also Oplinger & Willard, David Brennan’s White Hat 
Management Changes the Way Business, Politics and School Vouchers Mix, supra note 129 
(noting that Brennan has “turned his attention to charter schools, which may [allow] him to 
focus on an important principle: making money”); Stephens, Ohio Virtually Booming with 
Cyber Schools, supra note 5; Welsh-Huggins, supra note 132 (noting that as of March, 2005, 
72 percent of students attending cyberschools attend three privately run cyberschools).   
139See generally WELLS & SCOTT, supra note 97, at 234, 237 (noting that the way charter 
school laws are written allow for or produce privatization effects).   
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Like vouchers, Ohio charter schools are politically and legally contested because 
of their privatization aspects.  However, unlike the resolved voucher litigation, the 
legal challenges to charter schools in Ohio have just begun.  A state constitutional 
challenge to Ohio’s charter school law, Ohio Congress of Parents & Teachers, is the 
subject of discussion in section VI below.   
V.  COMPARISON OF IDEOLOGIES – PRIVATIZATION AND THE OHIO CONSTITUTION  
The history of the “Constitutional Common School” in Ohio demonstrates that 
the Common School is at the heart of the Ohio Constitution’s conception of a 
democratic and universal public education.  Not only was the ordinary common or 
“public” school the goal, but the framers of the Ohio Constitution of 1851 
passionately stated their adherence to that ideology.  With this in mind, it seems 
useful to compare privatization ideology with the basic theoretical underpinnings of 
the Constitution’s understanding of what would constitute a “thorough and efficient 
system” of education. 
There are two related concepts that are central to the Constitutional Common 
School system, and antithetical to the privatization ideology.  First, the purpose of 
public education is to foster republican citizenship and shared democratic values, and 
second, the beneficiary of education under the Constitutional Common School model 
is the state.  
A.  Formal Equality vs. Equal Opportunity 
The gravamen of the constitutional argument against privatization can be stated 
as follows:  Privatization faithfully expects market forces to provide an equal 
educational opportunity, whereas the Ohio Constitution requires the state to deliver 
on that promise.  (Once again, note the framer’s use of the word “shall” in the 
education clause within the ideological context of the Common School movement.)  
Privatization as a method of satisfying the private benefit purpose of education 
(within the context of privatization ideology) relies on the market to deliver equal 
opportunity in education.140  In contrast, the goal of providing an equal opportunity to 
all classes, races, etc. of children is apparent in the Common School movement and 
the convention debates.141  This is a fine, but significant, distinction.  The distinction 
leads to the conclusion that, instead of affirmatively pursuing equal educational 
opportunity for all children, privatization stops at a point closer to “formal equality.”   
Formal equality is a concept in constitutional law that “seeks fairness by 
preventing governments from using certain traits, notably race and gender, to disable 
individuals.”142  It is a relatively easy burden to shoulder because it has only negative 
content; it simply prohibits unfair provisions of services as opposed to requiring 
provision of services to level the playing field.143  Although somewhat lacking in 
                                                                
140Smith discusses this concept in terms of “public choice theory.”  SMITH, supra note 10, 
at 4. 
141Equality of social class was an explicit goal, but racial equality was not an intended 
outcome for the framers of Ohio’s constitution.  Debates of 1850-51, supra note 69, at 11. 
142James Wilson, Why a Fundamental Right to a Quality Education is Not Enough, 34 
AKRON L. REV. 383, 387 (2000).   
143Id. 
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substantive content as well, “equal opportunity” recognizes a more affirmative duty 
of the state to create the conditions necessary to provide an education that equalizes 
opportunities for all classes of Ohio children.144   
An analogy can be drawn between the neutrality of the market and the negative 
content of formal equality.  That is, under a pure market approach (privatization) the 
state provides funds but the market ensures their equal distribution.  Thus, 
privatization proponents argue that the state is relieved of any possibility of 
discriminating against any interest yet children still benefit from a system that 
provides for their educational needs through market forces acting to provide equal 
opportunities for all.145 
A leap of faith is required to believe in the market’s capacity to deliver equal 
educational opportunity to children.  First, market theory depends on the notion that 
parents are capable of maximizing educational returns for their children via school 
choice.  But, as numerous commentators conclude, this is highly unlikely to be the 
case.146  More importantly, education is primarily about the child, not the parent.  It is 
wildly improbable that children, (e.g., kindergarteners) are the rational economic 
actors upon which privatization theory depends.  Basing the state system of 
education on parental choice therefore subjects some children to the bad choices of 
their parents in a public context.  That is, the state may not interfere with parents’ 
legitimate privacy interest in the freedom to make a bad (or good) choice to send 
their child to a private school,147 but the same choice in the privatization context is 
essentially sponsored by the state.  Ultimately, a state system that undermines the 
public benefits purpose of public schools risks creating a system in which the quality 
of a child’s education depends on the quality of their parent’s choices.  
Unfortunately, this may be a recipe for perpetuating a hereditary class system. 
On the other hand, the Common School ideology is more in line with the notion 
of equal opportunity and the tendency toward affirmative rather than negative state 
duties.  Recognition of social inequalities and the need to use education to avoid 
making them part of a child’s inheritance is embedded in the Common School 
philosophy and, as a result, the Ohio Constitution.  The shift in the Constitutional 
language from encouragement to guarantee is indicative of the affirmative nature of 
                                                                
144Id. at 387-88. 
145Wells & Scott, supra note 97, at 236 (citing M. Carnoy, School Improvement:  Is 
Privatization the Answer? in Decentralization and School Improvement:  Can We Fulfill the 
Promise? 163-201 (J. Hannaway and M. Carnoy eds., 1993)). 
146See, e.g., Alfie Kohn, Privatization of Schools in EDUCATION, INC.:  TURNING LEARNING 
INTO A BUSINESS 102 (Alfie Kohn & Patrick Shannon eds., 2002).  Kohn says that 
“[p]rivatizing schools is predicated on an almost childlike faith in competition . . . .”  Id.  He 
also notes that shifting to a market basis means shifting resources to marketing schools, not 
delivering educational benefits.  Id.  Benveniste et. al. continue this line of reasoning by noting 
that parents are uncertain about education and wary of radical curricula.  Therefore, the market 
incentive is toward the status quo, not innovation.  LUIS BENVENISTE ET. AL., ALL ELSE EQUAL:  
ARE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS DIFFERENT? xv (2003).  See generally Makani N. Themba, 
“Choice” and Other White Lies in EDUCATION, INC.:  TURNING LEARNING INTO A BUSINESS 
140 (Alfie Kohn & Patrick Shannon eds., 2002) (concluding that school choice is simply not a 
reality for many segments of the population). 
147Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925). 
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the state’s responsibility for education.148  Again, relating this to the Ohio framers’ 
debate regarding educating freemen is instructive.  The solution that the framers 
chose was rooted more in equal opportunity than formal equality.  The “thorough 
and efficient” clause in the Ohio Constitution uses the word “shall” to create a 
positive state duty to all Ohio children.149  It does not frame the state’s responsibility 
as a negative right for certain races or classes to attend public schools.   
In addition, the affirmative state duty approach acknowledges that private goals 
are not always in line with state goals. 150  For instance, some might argue that 
privatized schools can provide the state system of public schools that emphasizes the 
importance of democratic citizenship contemplated by the Ohio Constitution.  
However, “democratic citizenship” is not likely to be a marketable idea to parents 
who look to education for its private benefits and are concerned mostly with ensuring 
economic advantage for their children.151  Thus, without active state involvement, it 
is unlikely that schools will promote democratic citizenship because there is no 
economic incentive to do so.  In contrast it is the very absence of a driving market 
ideology that makes this a viable goal for public schools.152   
B.  Private vs. Public Benefits 
The way individuals view the goals of education and the way the state views the 
goals of education may be significantly different.  An individual tends to think 
primarily about what an education will do for himself or her family.  Society at large, 
on the other hand, is likely to have a much broader view that emphasizes the benefits 
that education confers on the state.  Privatization advocates prioritize individual 
goals and believe that the market can best provide for the natural diversity of 
individuals’ educational preferences through choice.153  The opposing view, which is 
at the heart of the Common School ideology, prioritizes the notion that the benefits 
of education accrue to everyone in society, even those people who have no direct 
personal stake in schools such as families without children.154  It is clear from the 
history of Ohio’s Constitutional Common School that the framers intended to 
prioritize the latter view that education is a public benefit.   
                                                                
148Kagan, supra note 1920, at 2258 (stating that State Constitutions’ ‘adequacy clauses’ 
“create positive state duties . . . rather than negative rights”). 
149The clause states that: “The general assembly shall . . . secure a thorough and efficient 
system of common schools throughout the state . . . .”  OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2 (emphasis 
added).   
150ENGEL, supra note 88, at 89.   
151Id.  In some respects, the discussion of which is beyond the scope of this Note, the 
private benefits approach may threaten to initiate a “tragedy of the commons” cycle.  See 
generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (Dec. 13, 1968). 
152Id. 
153LEVIN, supra note 10, at 8 (“[T]he goal of meaningful choice is to address private 
benefits.”).  Some privatization advocates take a more radical position.  Based on the idea that 
families and individuals are the beneficiaries of education, they argue that all education should 
be financed privately; that the state should not be involved at all.  Levin calls this an 
uncommon but important view.  Id. at 6.   
154Id. at 7.   
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This intention is evident in both the principles of the Common School movement 
and the content of the convention debates.  Central to the Common School ideology 
is the belief that shared experiences will inculcate common civic values and promote 
the ultimate goal of the Common School system: the furtherance of an egalitarian 
democratic republic.155  Therefore, an approach that emphasizes market exploitation 
of educational niches created by the private preferences of individual families is 
inconsistent with the Common School ideology.  In other words, an approach that 
replaces the “melting pot” metaphor with the “tossed salad” metaphor conflicts with 
the framer’s intent to use schools to create an integrated society.156  Furthermore, the 
delegates’ discussion of educating freemen plainly illustrates that they conceived of 
public education as a public benefit.  In fact, the Ohio Constitution Debates of 1850-
51, quoted supra in section III, C, 1, clearly imply that the framers cared little about 
the private benefits that an education would confer on an African American 
individual.  The argument that carried the day was that freemen should be educated 
in order to benefit white society—the contemporary conception of Ohio society.157  
Modern commentators note that public schools have traditionally served an 
important role in “processing” difficult social and political issues, e.g., racism or the 
Vietnam War.158  That is, students in local public schools learn to deal with the 
complex social issues of the day because students with diverse backgrounds and 
perspectives attend the same school.  In contrast, proponents of privatization would 
view this social function as a distraction from the academic goal of schools.159  To be 
sure, the academic purposes of education have public benefits.  However, academics 
are only part of the Common School ideology.  Therefore, to the extent that the 
pursuit of private educational benefits prioritizes academic goals it may short-change 
the democratizing function of public schools that is central to the Common School 
ideology.160   
                                                                
155O’Brien, supra note 51, at 144.  More polemic commentators such as Henry A. Giroux 
take very strong positions on this issue.  For example, Giroux says, “democratic culture cannot 
survive unless schooling gets treated as a public good rather than a private good.”  GIROUX, 
supra note 88, at 105. 
156O’Brien, supra note 51, at 169-70.  This is a classic metaphor most often used in the 
context of multiculturalism.  Although the imagery is not as potent, it seems that the most 
accurate conception of the idea would be the scientific distinction between a mixture and a 
solution. 
157Debates of 1850-51, supra note 69, at 11. 
158For example, Smith notes that democratic conflict being played out in schools is 
consistent with their purpose and serves an important democratic role.  SMITH, supra note 10, 
at 9.  
159Id. at 10.   
160Smith points out that this democratizing function of public schools can be a double-
edged sword.  At the same time that shared experiences and participation in an institution 
reflecting the social and political values of the community promotes democratic awareness and 
responsibility, it also may propagate the “dominant socio-economic hierarchy and embed it in 
successive generations.”  SMITH, supra note 10, at 12.  Smith goes on to suggest, however, that 
market reforms might only exacerbate this problem.  Id.  However, this brings up a larger 
issue that is beyond the scope of this note.  That is, what, exactly, are the democratic values 
referenced here?  See FULLER, supra note 99, at 8-10 (discussing the issue under the heading 
29Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2005
496 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:467 
Likewise, the criticism that “government schools” are ineffective because of their 
inherently bureaucratic nature is inconsistent with the democratic process itself. 161  
This is precisely because bureaucracy is inherent in the democratic process, and any 
large organization.  Therefore, privatization as a method of eliminating bureaucracy 
is an implicit attack on the democratic process.162  This is not to say that the more 
schools become knotted by bureaucracy, the better they are enacting their 
constitutional purpose.  It is only meant to further illustrate the fundamental contrasts 
between the privatization ideology at the heart of the school choice movement and 
the democratic emphasis of the Common School movement out of which the Ohio 
Constitution’s approach to education arose.  
VI.  CONSTITUTIONALITY OF OHIO CHARTER SCHOOLS 
This history and an informed reading of the text of the Ohio Constitution make it 
clear that the ideology of privatization is incompatible with the Ohio Constitution.  
The question then is whether and to what extent Ohio community school laws 
demonstrate privatization characteristics.163  In attempting to answer this question, 
this section will discuss the plaintiffs’ claims in the Ohio Parents & Teachers case, a 
current Ohio state case challenging the validity of Ohio community schools under 
the Ohio Constitution.164 
                                                          
 
“What Rendition of Democracy for America?”).  The common school ideal is vulnerable to 
criticism “for promoting uniformity at the cost of individuality . . . .”  O’Brien & Woodrum, 
supra note 12, at 641.  There is an argument that the idea of teaching a certain set of values is 
inconsistent with the modern understanding of values as less universal and relative to culture, 
faith, etc.  Id.  Without entering too far into this particular debate however, it seems plausible 
to argue that the political form of democracy has certain civic values embedded within it that 
define the core values of the constitutional common school in every era.  Id.  
161SMITH, supra note 10, at 9. 
162Id.  
163Although there are numerous books and articles about charter schools, there is 
surprisingly little unbiased or legal commentary regarding the character of Ohio charter 
schools.  This is probably because Ohio’s charter school legislation is relatively recent (1997).  
For example, Bruce Fuller’s book Inside Charter Schools, includes an extensive index with no 
entry for Ohio.  FULLER, supra note 99.  A very recent and thorough source of information on 
Ohio’s charter schools is a study by the Progressive Policy Institute.  Russo, supra note 79.  
Other valuable sources of information on Ohio Charter schools include the publications of the 
Ohio Department of Education, Office of Community Schools available at 
http://www.ode.state.oh.us/community_schools (last visited Aug. 31, 2005), the Ohio 
Legislative Office of Education Oversight, available at http://www.loeo.state.oh.us (last 
visited Aug. 31, 2005), and websites of interest groups such as the Center for Education 
Reform (CER), available at http://www.edreform.com (last visited Aug. 31, 2005). 
164State ex rel. Ohio Congress of Parents and Teachers, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 4009.  
There are other cases challenging Ohio’s charter schools as well, including federal court cases.  
Russo, supra note 79, at 23.  This particular case, however, has a published appellate opinion 
and represents charter school opponents’ state constitutional arguments well.  Id.     
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A.  Ohio Parents and  Teacher’s Case:  Summary  
of the 10th Appellate District Decision165 
The plaintiffs/appellants in this case are coalitions advocating on behalf of public 
schools, school districts, and teachers’ unions.  The Ohio Board of Education, along 
with various community schools, are the defendants/appellees, while White Hat 
Management, LLC, a “limited liability corporation that controls various community 
schools,” is an intervening defendant/appellee.166  There are six claims at issue.  First, 
the plaintiffs claim that community schools are not part of the state system of 
Common Schools mandated by the “thorough and efficient” clause of the 
constitution because they are not owned by the public or managed by elected 
officials.167  Second, the plaintiffs claim that community schools are allowed to 
operate with diminished standards in violation of the same clause.168  Third, plaintiffs 
allege that the method that the state uses to fund community schools diverts funds 
from local school districts and thereby deprives them of the ability to satisfy the 
“thorough and efficient” clause.169  Fourth, the plaintiffs allege that “community 
schools violate Section 3, Article VI, Ohio Constitution, in that community schools 
are not subject to local voter control” and “unconstitutionally create a shadow system 
of privately owned and managed schools that circumvent local control through 
locally elected school boards.”170  Fifth, the plaintiffs contend that community 
schools unconstitutionally take locally voted and levied property tax revenues 
without distinctly saying so.171  Lastly, the plaintiffs claim that “community schools 
are not bona fide not-for-profit corporations, but, instead, are dominated by private 
interests and, therefore, improperly tap into public funds.”172 
                                                                
165The procedural posture of the case is as follows:  The plaintiffs filed their third 
amended complaint in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas in April of 2002.  State ex 
rel. Ohio Congress of Parents and Teachers, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 4009, at *2.  In May of 
2003, that court dismissed claims four through seven, which challenge the constitutionality of 
Ohio community schools.  Id.  The defendants then filed an appeal in the Tenth Appellate 
District of the Ohio Court of Appeals.  The trial court chose to address the constitutional 
claims first, and therefore only claims four through seven are relevant to the appeal.  Id. at *4.  
After determining that the trial court’s decision is a final appealable order (given that they did 
not yet address other claims in the complaint), the appellate court addressed the merits of the 
defendants’ claims.  Id. at *5.  The court applied the de novo standard of review because of the 
grant of summary judgment at the trial level.  Id. at *10.   
166Id. at *1-2.  See supra notes 128-29 for more discussion of White Hat Management and 
its founder’s (David Brennan) connection to privatization and education in Ohio. 
167State ex rel. Ohio Congress of Parents and Teachers, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 4009, at 
*11-12. 
168Id. at *13. 
169Id.  
170Id. at *20. 
171Id. at *22 (relating to “Section 5, Article XII, Ohio Constitution, which provides:   . . .  
every law imposing a tax shall state, distinctly, the object of the same, to which only, it shall 
be applied”).  
172Id. at *24-25.  This particular claim relates to borrowing provisions in the community 
school laws and to  
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In its opinion, the Tenth District Courts of Appeals first concluded that, because 
the legislature specifically stated that community schools were part of the state’s 
system of public education, they were Common Schools within the language of the 
Ohio Constitution.173  Then, the court rejected the lower court’s finding that the 
DeRolph case barred re-litigation of the plaintiffs claims related to diminished 
standards and diversion of funds.174  The court affirmed dismissal of the claims 
related to local control by elected school boards, reasoning that the Constitution 
gives the General Assembly broad authority to provide for a thorough and efficient 
system of common schools, and that modifying school districts is within that 
power.175  As to the diversion of funds and disclosure to voters of the purpose of a 
local tax, the court concluded that the claim raises issues of fact and reversed the 
lower court dismissal.176  Lastly, the court sent the final issue—private gain from 
public funds—back to the trial court as well, reasoning that it could be better 
addressed by the trial court.177  Thus, the appellate court did little to resolve the 
substantive issues and remanded the matter to the Franklin County Court of 
Common Pleas.  The Ohio Supreme Court granted certiorari on February 16, 2005, 
and the Court will likely hear oral arguments at the end of 2005.   
B.  Analysis of the Plaintiff’s Constitutional Claims 
The claims in Ohio Parents & Teachers now before the Ohio Supreme Court can 
be summarized as follows:  community schools violate the Ohio Constitution by de 
facto operating outside the state system of public education, diverting state funds 
from local school districts, and funneling public funds meant to provide a public 
benefit to private beneficiaries.  Each of these claims is legitimate under the theory 
that privatization is unconstitutional.   
1.  Operating Outside the State System of Public Education 
Ohio charter school laws, like those of other states, are designed to permit 
innovation by removing many state regulations applicable to traditional public 
schools.178  This is consistent with the original purpose of charter schools, which was 
                                                          
 
Section 4, Article VIII, Ohio Constitution, which provides:  The credit of the state 
shall not in any manner, be given or loaned to, or in aid of, and individual association 
or corporation whatever; nor shall the state ever hereafter become a joint owner, or 
stockholder, in any company or association in this state, or elsewhere, formed for any 
purpose whatever.   
State ex rel. Ohio Congress of Parents and Teachers, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 4009, at **24-
25. 
173Id. at *12-13. 
174Id. at *13-19. 
175Id. at *21. 
176Id. at *23. 
177Id. at **25. 
178Legislative Office of Education Oversight (LOEO), Community Schools in Ohio:  Final 
Report on Student Performance, Parent Satisfaction, and Accountability, (Dec. 2003), 
available at http://www.loeo.state.oh.us/reports/PreEleSecPDF/CS_Final_Web.pdf 
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that they would serve as laboratories for educational reform and experimentation 
within the public school model.179  In fact, Ohio charter school legislation exempts 
community schools from over one hundred state regulations: from the requirement to 
pay full-time employees while on jury duty, to the required twenty-five-to-one 
student-teacher ratio, to supervision by a local school board, to less stringent teacher 
certification requirements.180  This plethora of exemptions is one of the main reasons 
Ohio’s charter school laws are considered “strong” by national charter school 
advocates.181   
However, as the court noted in Ohio Parents & Teachers, the exemptions do not 
necessarily place community schools outside the boundaries of the state system of 
public education.  The Ohio Constitution clearly gives the legislature the authority to 
create a system of Common Schools in the state and does not specify how that 
should be accomplished.182  On the other hand, as one commentator put it, saying a 
charter school is a public school doesn’t necessarily make it so—it must function as 
a public school.183 
a.  Exemptions Placing Charter Schools Outside the Common School System 
Certain types of exemptions lead to results that substantially privatize community 
schools.  Because privatization characteristics are incompatible with the Ohio 
Constitution, these exemptions are unconstitutional in that they cause charter schools 
not to function as a public school.   
i.  Exemption from the Democratic Purpose of Education 
Section 3313.602(B) and (C) of the Ohio Revised Code exempt community 
schools from the requirement “that the ‘principles of democracy and ethics’ are 
                                                          
 
[hereinafter LOEO Final Report] (noting that community schools trade freedom from 
regulations for accountability). 
179O’Brien, supra note 51, at 139-40.  
180See LOEO Final Report, supra note 177, at A1-A13 (listing thirteen pages of over one-
hundred Ohio Revised Code sections from which community schools are exempt).  Some 
other examples of exemptions include:  §§ 3301.07 (State Board of Education minimum 
standards on teacher training etc.); 3313.01-.18 (School Boards); 3313.202 (provision of 
health insurance to employees); 3313.602(A) (policy on reciting the pledge of allegiance); 
3313.609 (retaining certain chronic truants); 3313.811 (prohibiting the sale of anything for 
profit unless all profits are used for school purposes or activities); 3313.97 (intradistrict open 
enrollment, except for the requirement of notice within the community); 3317.022(c)(5) 
(special education funds must be spent on special education students).  Id.  See also Scott 
Stephens, Charters Use Teachers Not Fully Certified, Traditional Schools Held to Higher 
Standards When Picking Instructors, THE PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 24, 2005, at A1 (noting that 
fifty-five percent of teachers in Ohio charter schools are fully state-certified compared to 
ninety-eight percent of teachers in traditional Ohio public schools). 
181See CER, supra note 163. 
182State ex rel. Ohio Congress of Parents and Teachers, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 4009 at 
*12-13. 
183Robert J. Martin, Charting the Court Challenges to Charter Schools 109 PENN. ST. L. 
REV. 43, 50 (2004). 
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emphasized and discussed in appropriate parts of the curriculum” and that the 
schools encourage employees to be aware of their role in instilling democratic 
values.184  This explicitly undermines the democratic focus of the Constitutional 
Common School.  Proponents of charter schools might argue that they are not 
designed to undermine anything, but only to deregulate charter schools in order to 
promote innovation.  It would have been easy, however, not to exempt charter 
schools from this requirement.  This exemption is a repudiation of the framer’s 
democratic purpose for public education.  Furthermore, it epitomizes the distinction 
between the private benefits view of education put forward by privatization 
advocates and the public benefit view that underpins the Constitutional Common 
School.185 
Exemption from the democratic purpose of public education is no small matter.  
In addition to the Ohio Constitution’s requirement that public schools educate for 
citizenship as well as knowledge, the United States Supreme Court has cited the 
democratic purpose of public schools as a justification for limiting a right as 
fundamental as free speech.  For example, in Bethel School District v. Fraser the 
U.S. Supreme Court held that the First Amendment did not prohibit a school from 
disciplining a student for lewd speech because such speech undermined the schools’ 
educational mission.186  In his majority opinion, Chief Justice Burger reasoned that 
“[t]he process of educating our youth for citizenship in public schools is not confined 
to books, the curriculum, and the civics class; schools must teach by example the 
shared values of a civilized social order.”187  The Chief Justice also noted that:  
[Public] education must prepare pupils for citizenship in the Republic. . . . 
It must inculcate the habits and manners of civility as values in 
themselves conducive to happiness and as indispensable to the practice of 
self-government in the community and the nation. . . . In [Ambach v. 
Norwick] we echoed the essence of this statement of the objectives of 
                                                                
184OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 3313.602(B)-(C) (LexisNexis 2004).  These sections provide as 
follows:  
(B) In the development of its graded course of study, the board of education of each 
city and exempted village school district and the governing board of each educational 
service center shall ensure that the principles of democracy and ethics are emphasized 
and discussed wherever appropriate in all parts of the curriculum for grades 
kindergarten through twelve. 
(C) Each city, local, exempted village, and joint vocational school board shall adopt 
policies that encourage all certificated and noncertificated employees to be cognizant 
of their roles in instilling ethical principles and democratic ideals in all district pupils. 
Id.  City, village and vocational schools are specifically mentioned in these subsections while 
community schools are not.  In other portions of the code, e.g., subsection (D) of § 3313.602, 
community schools are specifically mentioned.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.602(D) 
(LexisNexis 2004). See also LOEO Final Report, supra note 178, at A-5. 
185See supra § V, B entitled “Public vs. Private Benefits”. 
186Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).   
187Id. at 683. 
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public education as the [inculcation of] fundamental values necessary to 
the maintenance of a democratic political system.188  
This and other similar cases underscore the historical and contemporary 
understanding of the importance of a democratic purpose for public schools.189  It is a 
fundamental concept that should not be jettisoned by Ohio charter school laws. 
ii.  Exemption from Control by the School Board 
Another exemption—exempting community schools from control by local school 
boards and vesting that control in the State Board of Education—seems legitimately 
within the public realm.190  The State Board of Education is still a public governing 
body.  However, as of July 1, 2005, the Ohio Department of Education is no longer 
responsible for primary oversight of charter schools.  Instead, that responsibility has 
been delegated to various “sponsors” including a church, a cultural group, and a 
housing development contractor.191  These private groups essentially control who 
receives the millions of dollars of state money going to charter schools. 
With this in mind, the reality is that control of many community schools, perhaps 
the majority, ends up in the hands of private EMOs.192  Coupled with the observation 
                                                                
188Id. at 681 (quoting C. BEARD & M. BEARD, NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 
228 (1968) and Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979)) (citations and quotations 
omitted). 
189Id.; see also Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
190OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3314.02(C) (LexisNexis 2004).  This section of the community 
school laws requires a charter school to have a sponsor.  Prior to 2005, most community 
schools were sponsored by the State Board of Education.  See LOEO Final Report, supra note 
178.  However, after July 1, 2005, tax-exempt, education-oriented entities meeting certain 
requirements will be able to act as community school sponsors.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
3314.02(C)(1)(f) (LexisNexis 2004).  In practice, community schools have always been able 
to contract with an EMO after receiving their charter through a tax-exempt sponsor; however, 
this change will make the form even less of an obstacle to the substance.  See also WELLS & 
SCOTT, supra note 97, at 246; Oplinger & Willard, Charter Experiment Goes Awry, supra note 
4 (noting that only non-profits can start a charter school but that they often work hand in hand 
with EMOs such that it is hard to distinguish one from the other).  
191Doug Oplinger & Dennis J. Willard, Charter School Oversight Shifts—Regulation by 
Private Entities Sparks Fears of Conflict of Interest, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, Jul. 23, 2005, 
at A1.  A sponsor is responsible for approving charter school contracts and for the 
accountability of the charter school.  The following groups are among the entities that may 
sponsor charter schools:  any local public school district, Ashe Cultural Center (an African-
American cultural group), Auglaize County Educational Service Center, Buckeye Community 
Hope Foundation (a developer of federal housing projects), Ohio Council of Community 
Schools (headed by Allison Perz), St. Aloysius Orphanage, and Educational Resource 
Consultants of Ohio (affiliated with Christ Tabernacle Ministries of Excellence).  Doug 
Ooinger & Dennis J. Willard, School Sponsors, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, Jul. 23, 2005, at 
A4.  See also Charter School Conflict Suggested, THE CINCINNATI POST, Jul. 25, 2005, at A6 
(noting that “[m]any sponsors . . . can conduct much of their work in private because they are 
not subject to Ohio’s open meetings and open records laws”). 
192Over seventy percent of state funding and charter school enrollment goes to EMOs, and, 
of the EMOs over half are for-profit entities.  The Ohio Coalition for Equity and Adequacy, 
Community Schools in Ohio:  Overview to Ohio Community Schools Spreadsheets (Sept. 17, 
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that oversight of community schools has been chronically lacking since their 
inception, schools operated by EMOs are functionally outside the state system of 
common schools.193  When an EMO exercises total control over a school, the 
motivation to educate is dominated by private, market-based concerns as opposed to 
public, citizenship concerns.  The end, profit, is almost certain to influence the 
means. 194  This will not be an accident or a possible side effect, but instead the 
intended essence of the for-profit charter school.   
b.  Profit-Motive Undermines the Fundamental Purposes  
of the Constitutional Common School System 
One commentator asserts that there are two ways to make money operating 
schools:  cut wages and/or cut services.195  The approach of Ohio’s largest EMO, 
White Hat Management, seems to bear out this hypothesis.  White Hat teachers are 
unusually relatively inexperienced.  In 2003-2004 the average White Hat teacher had 
2.2 years of experience and a salary of $29,000 while the average public school 
teachers had 14 years of experience and a salary of $46,700.196  In addition, some 
White Hat schools have large student-teacher ratios; one school reported a ratio of 
                                                          
 
2004), http://www.ohiocoalition.org/pdfs/Funding_for_Charter_Schools.pdf, at 5 [hereinafter 
Community Schools Overview].  These numbers are up over twenty percent since from 1999.  
Oplinger & Willard, Charter Experiment Goes Awry, supra note 4.  Nationally, ten to twelve 
percent of charter schools are operated by EMOs.  Walk, supra note 91, at 241.  Therefore, 
Ohio, in which sixty-six percent of charter schools are operated by EMOs, is well above the 
national average.  Russo, supra note 80, at 5.  In fact, in its overview of privatization in public 
education, Education Week magazine calls EMOs the “second wave” in the charter 
movement.  Education Week Research Center:  Privatization of Public Education (2005), 
available at http://www.edweek.org/rc/issues/privatization-of-public-education (last visited 
Aug. 31, 2005). 
193See Oplinger & Willard, Charter Experiment Goes Awry, supra note 4 (detailing the 
state’s gross disregard for its oversight responsibilities during the first few years of Ohio 
community schools); Community Schools Overview, supra note 192, at 10 (describing the 
lack of accountability to which community schools have been held as of 2004); Russo, supra 
note 79, at 31 (describing the serious lack of accountability data available on community 
schools and including increased accountability and oversight in concluding policy 
recommendations). 
194WELLS & SCOTT, supra note 97, at 247-48.  But see Walk, supra note 92, at 243. 
195MINER, supra note 86, at 138.  
196Jennifer Mrozowski, These Schools Sell Education for Profit, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, 
Jun. 30, 2005, at 1A (quoting national charter school researcher Gary Miron concerning for-
profit charter schools:  “In large part, a lot of money is siphoned off for management fees.  It 
doesn’t get to instruction.”); Doug Oplinger & Dennis J. Willard, Parents Have Freedom of 
Choice, But Not Freedom of Information, THE AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, Dec. 12, 1999, at 
A1.  This difference in salary and experience is not specific to White Hat schools, but true of 
charter schools in general.  Scott Stephens, Teachers Leaving Charter Schools, THE PLAIN 
DEALER, Jul. 1, 2005, at B1 (citing an study conducted by a Ohio State University research 
group established by the Ohio Board of Regents).  One reason that teachers at charter schools 
are relatively inexperienced is that half of them leave each year.  Jennifer Mrozowski, 
Charters Have High Turnover, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Jul. 3, 2005, at 1C. 
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ninety-three to one.197  Moreover, White Hat has cut costs by not offering services 
like gifted programs and instead has done just the opposite by offering a high school 
diploma for computer-based tutoring for three hours per day designed to achieve 
ninth grade proficiency.198   
Furthermore the numerous cyberschools, many of them operated by for-profit 
EMOs, that have opened in the past several years demonstrate how far deregulation 
has allowed community schools to stray from the Constitutional Common School 
goals of democratic citizenship.  In common language, “community cyberschool” 
would be an oxymoron.  Instead of bringing all the diversity of the community 
together in a common learning environment, cyberschools by their nature isolate 
individuals from the community.199  
Similarly, charter schools can interfere with the democratic purpose of education 
in more subtle ways such as de facto pupil selectivity.  That is, certain societal 
groups (defined by wealth, religion, etc.) are strategically excluded or included 
because of the design of the specific charter school.  Studies of charter schools in 
California and Michigan concluded that charter school laws can allow for and even 
compel schools to become more private and expand financial and other 
inequalities.200  Some ways in which charter schools may purposely or inadvertently 
exclude certain students or families include: targeted recruitment of certain types of 
students (especially via first-come-first-serve enrollment), mandatory parent 
meetings/involvement, and geographic distribution of charter schools.201  This is 
privatization to the extent that certain children, often of poor, undereducated, or 
unconcerned parents, are sorted out.  The Ohio law, O.R.C.§ 3313.97, exempting 
charter schools from open school district enrollment might have this effect.202  
Although charter schools are not exempt from notifying families within the 
immediate vicinity of the charter school under this law, during the first several years 
no charter school designed to serve the generalized public needs of a neighborhood 
community had opened in Ohio.203   
On the other hand, no available study of Ohio charter schools has found the kind 
of targeted recruitment strategies discussed in the California study.204  The most 
                                                                
197Community Schools Overview, supra note 192, at 9; Stephens, Teachers Leaving 
Charter Schools, supra note 195 (noting that the average student-teacher ratio in Ohio charter 
schools is 30-1 compared to 19-1 in traditional public schools). 
198Id.; See also Oplinger & Willard, Charter Experiment Goes Awry, supra note 4 (also 
noting that, although EMOs were making profits, there was no evidence that they were 
reducing costs).   
199See generally ENGEL, supra note 88, at 86.  See also Welsh-Huggins, supra note 132 
(noting that student/teacher interaction has been an issue in Ohio cyberschools and that Ohio 
state legislators will “look at online academies to ensure that pupils interact with teachers”). 
200WELLS & SCOTT, supra note 97, at 234-35; Oplinger & Willard, Parents Have Freedom 
of Choice, But Not Freedom of Information, supra note 196. 
201WELLS & SCOTT, supra note 97, at 250-53 (calling charter school’s ability to control 
who enrolls as “refining the art of excluding the unwelcome”). 
202OHIO REV. CODE ANN § 3313.97 (LexisNexis 2004). 
203Oplinger & Willard, Charter Experiment Goes Awry, supra note 4. 
204
 WELLS & SCOTT, supra note 97, at 234-35. 
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recent data indicates that “Ohio’s charter schools serve higher percentages of poor 
and minority students than traditional public schools in the state.”205  Nonetheless, it 
is likely that the scope of deregulation enacted by Ohio’s “strong” charter school 
laws has had a social privatization effect.  As one researcher stated it, “[t]he potential 
is there for various kinds of sorting and selection . . . . [t]hat we regard as a 
dysfunctional development.”206  In fact, the social privatization effect of Ohio charter 
schools may be to further isolate underprivileged children.  The fact that charter 
schools serve a higher percentage of poor children simply indicates increased 
segregation of the poor from the affluent, thereby subverting the integration goal of 
the Constitutional Common School. 
Another aspect of deregulation that the plaintiffs’ claims address is the creation 
of a competing “shadow system” of charter schools operating with diminished 
academic standards.207  The “thorough and efficient” clause contemplates one system 
of state-funded public education.  Prior to the Constitutional Convention of 1850-51 
Ohio schools were fragmented, with state money going to various disconnected 
sectarian schools.208  The convention delegates regarded this competition among 
schools as “the greatest impediment to the advancement of education.”209  They 
purposely chose to avoid creating competing factions by requiring a system of 
Common Schools.210  However, the current rules, particularly § 3314.02, purposely 
create charter schools to compete with struggling traditional public schools in hopes 
of fostering improvement via competitive market forces.211  Ironically, charter 
schools are then given a competitive advantage in that they are exempt from many of 
the state mandates that increase costs and dictate the degree and manner of services 
provided.212  It seems patently unfair to assert that the neutrality of a competitive 
                                                                
205Russo, supra note 79, at 14. 
206Oplinger & Willard, Parents Have Freedom of Choice, But Not Freedom of 
Information, supra note 195. 
207State ex rel. Ohio Congress of Parents and Teachers, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 4009, at 
*20; Scott Stephens, Charter Schools Get a Break: Rules Let Low Scores Draw a Passing 
Grade, THE PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 9, 2004, at B1.  
208O’Brien & Woodrum, supra note 12, at 640. 
209Id. 
210
 Id. 
211OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3314.02 (LexisNexis 2004).  This section allows for the 
creation of new charter schools in urban and “challenged” school districts.  Thus, school 
districts that are already struggling in “academic watch” or “academic emergency” are subject 
to competition from a charter school.  Id.  The idea behind this is to give parents a way out of 
struggling traditional public schools, but also to provide market-based incentives for 
improvement.   
212For example, §§ 3317.022(C)(5), .023 of the Ohio Revised Code exempt community 
schools from provision of educational services requirements such as the student teacher ratio, 
the manner in which special education funds are spent, and special education staffing.  See 
also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.202 (LexisNexis 2004) (exempting community schools 
from “requirements related to the provision of life, health, accident, and legal insurance 
benefits for school district employees”);  LOEO Final Report, supra note 177, at A-3.  These 
are significant costs that community schools are able to manage in ways that traditional public 
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market will promote improvement and then create a system in which charter schools 
have a significant market advantage due to statutory exemptions.  The plaintiffs’ 
claims that deregulation creates a shadow system seem valid in light of the fact that 
charter schools and traditional schools are operating under significantly different 
standards; the absence of a level playing field suggests that there are really two 
playing fields.   
c.  Competition is a Pretext for Privatization of the Public School System, not a 
Stimulant to the Constitutional Common School System 
This unfairness indicates that competition within the public system is really a 
pretext for privatization of the system.  In fact, there is significant evidence that 
many of the key players involved in creating Ohio’s educational policy are adamant 
advocates of privatization, and that a considerable amount of lobbying and 
promotion has been designed to undermine the public’s faith in the public school 
system.213  For example, Governor Taft appointed Deborah Owens Fink to fill a 
vacant spot on the Ohio Board of Education.  Ms. Fink was formerly a contributor to 
the Buckeye Institute, a conservative Ohio think tank championing the “elimina[tion 
of] most of government and allowing free enterprise to solve society’s problems.”214  
                                                          
 
schools cannot.  In addition, the cyberschool saga indicates that charter school exemptions 
have allowed certain families or students to avoid mandatory proficiency testing.  That is, a 
significant number of students enrolled in cyberschools are not taking state-mandated 
proficiency tests, and online school enrollment declines at the beginning of March, when 
proficiency tests are administered.  Doug Oplinger & Dennis J. Willard, Online Students 
Missing Exams, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, June 3, 2005, at A1.   Even more ironically, the 
most recent studies do not indicate that charter schools are more successful, despite their 
competitive advantage. Ohio Department of Education 2004-2005 District Report Cards, 
available at http://www.ode.state.oh.us/reportcard/archives/Default.asp; Scott Stephens & 
Reginald Fields, Ohio Charter Schools Struggling, THE PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 18, 2005, at B1. 
213For example, when Governor Taft was asked whether there is statistical evidence that 
school choice improves academic performance, Taft dodged the question and responded:  “I 
have lost my patience with children trapped in failing schools.”  Dennis J. Willard & Doug 
Oplinger, Private School Funds to Go Up, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, Feb. 20, 2005, at A1.  
See also Oplinger & Willard, School Battle Eludes Voters, supra note 75 (describing the 
players in the political battle over educational policy in Ohio); Warsmith & Byard, supra note 
138.  Warsmith & Byard note that school choice advocates are winning the battle of public 
perception, i.e., convincing the public that traditional public schools are miserable failures.  
“Urban school leaders said what they are battling is often “perceptions” rather than the reality 
of what’s happening in their schools.  [One administrator] said parents have told her the 
district needs to get computers – when they already have them in every classroom.”  Id. 
214Oplinger & Willard, supra note 75.  The Buckeye Institute “supports dramatic reduction 
in the role of government,” receives contributions from EMO owner David Brennan, and 
publishes research supporting Brennan’s privatized schools.  Id.  The Institute’s research, 
however, has employed fuzzy math and been discredited in the past.  Id.  Furthermore, the 
Ohio Teacher’s Union recently accused David Brennan of trading campaign donations for 
favorable treatment of Brennan’s for-profit charter schools.  See e.g., Jennifer Mrozowski, 
Charter School Owner Accused, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, June 17, 2005, at 1B.  As a result, 
Brennan was asked to explain to Ohio’s legislative inspector general why he should not be 
considered a lobbyist.  Dennis J. Willard & Doug Oplinger, Brennan Faces Inquiry into 
Influence—Charter School Advocate to be Asked Why His Private Talks with Legislators 
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The Buckeye Institute has been active in the privatization movement in Ohio, 
although in a clandestine manner because the Institute believes that “school choice” 
would fail if submitted directly to the voters.  Instead, the Institute believes it can 
control educational policy in the state by controlling the Ohio General Assembly.215   
Educational lobbyists Clint Satow and David Zanotti have also spoken out 
against public schools using the language of privatization.  Satow has said that 
“community schools will eventually break [the] monopoly on public education . . . 
.”
216
  Zanotti, who has significant personal and professional ties to former Governor 
Voinovich and David Brennan, is the head of the School Choice Committee and 
certain right-wing religious groups advocating for school choice in order to create 
schools in line with a more conservative Christian ideology.217 
Finally, although it would seem that charter school proponents would want more 
funding to go toward public schools (because charter schools are supposedly public 
schools themselves, funded by tax dollars), Ohio charter school consultant Allison 
Perz encouraged charter school operators to vote against a ballot issue approving the 
sale of bonds to repair Ohio’s public school buildings because the issue does not 
directly benefit charter schools.218  The initiator of Ohio charter school legislation, 
former state legislator and current White Hat lobbyist Sally Perz (Allison Perz’s 
mother), expresses the privatization ideology underlying her approach by saying that 
charter schools should never have been under the auspices of the State Board of 
Education.  She said, “[i]t was a bad fit from the get go, having this entrepreneurial 
type of school housed in a big state bureaucracy.”219  Sally Perz also advocates for 
school choice for parents “no matter what,” indicating that, for her, charter schools 
are not about innovation within the Common School framework but about 
privatization generally.220   
This political atmosphere indicates that charter schools in Ohio are about the 
market ideology of privatization, and elevating factions–such as explicitly religious 
public schools–above the Common School ideology of an integrated democratic 
society.  Ohio has come to embody the suggestion of one educational privatization 
study, which states that:  “It is possible that some less-than-optimal charters have 
been ratified by expansive state laws in order to create a critical mass of charter 
schools that will rapidly inject market forces into public education.”221  This 
approach underscores the view that charter schools in Ohio are “a great idea for 
                                                          
 
Don’t Make Him a Lobbyist Under Law, July 10, 2005, at A1; but see Dennis J. Willard, State 
Rules Brennan No Lobbyist, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, Aug. 5, 2005, at A1. 
215Oplinger & Willard, supra note 75.  
216Id. 
217Id; see also Doug Oplinger & Dennis J. Willard, Campaign Organizer Pushes Hard for 
Changes:  David Zanotti Exercises Influence Over Officials While Leading the Attack on 
Public School System, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, Dec. 15, 1999, at A7. 
218Oplinger & Willard, supra note 75.   
219Russo, supra note 79, at 8. 
220Id. at 9. 
221KANE & LAURICELLA, supra note 80, at 212. 
40https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol53/iss3/7
2005-06] OHIO CHARTER SCHOOLS 507 
smaller more autonomous schools that has been hijacked by people whose idea is to 
privatize public education.”222 
2.  Diverting Funds from Local School Districts and  
Putting Public Dollars in Private Pockets 
The claims in State ex rel. Ohio Congress of Parents and Teachers that Ohio’s 
method of funding community schools channels state dollars away from local school 
districts and into private hands also implicates the prevalence of EMOs in the state.  
Essentially, the plaintiffs claim that the state actually gives locally raised tax dollars 
to charter schools without local voter approval.223  This claim is based on the fact that 
the state gives each school district a set per-pupil “foundation” amount multiplied by 
the number of pupils in the district.224  That number is then reduced by the amount of 
locally raised tax dollars up to a certain ceiling.225  This is known as a “charge-off.”  
However, for each pupil in a community school within a school district, the state 
deducts from that local district’s funds the full foundation amount prior to the local 
tax charge-off per student.226  Thus, local school districts can claim that either (1) 
local funds are supporting charter schools without local control of those schools; or, 
(2) the state is providing less funds because of the presence of charter schools in the 
district.227  If those funds are going to legitimately public schools within the state 
system of Common Schools, it may not matter that the school district is losing funds 
because the legislature has simply decided to reallocate the way it provides for a 
                                                                
222Russo, supra note 79, at 29. 
223State ex rel. Ohio Congress of Parents and Teachers, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 4009, at 
*22. 
224FY 2004 – FY 2005 Operating Budget Analysis, supra note 76, at 112.  The state uses a 
foundation formula to calculate state aid to public school districts.  Quality Counts 2005:  No 
Small Change:  Targeting Money Toward Student Performance, EDUCATION WEEK, Jan. 6, 
2005, Vol. 24, Issue 17, at 70.  “Foundation formulas” use a multi-step process to determine 
the amount necessary to provide school districts with a base level of funding necessary to 
provide an adequate education.   Id.  For the 2004-2005 school year, the foundation level in 
Ohio is $5,169.  FY 2004 – FY 2005 Operating Budget Analysis, supra note 76, at 111-12.   In 
order to calculate the total amount of cost for a district, the $5,169 is multiplied by the number 
of students in the district and the cost of doing business in the district.  Id. 
225FY 2004 – FY 2005 Operating Budget Analysis, supra note 76, at 111-12. 
226OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3314.08 (LexisNexis 2004). 
227For example:  Assume that the state gives funds in the amount of $100 per student and 
there are ten students in District A.  District A is thus entitled to $1000 of state aid before the 
local tax charge-off.  Assume that District A raises $600 in local property tax revenue.  The 
state then will subtract that $600 from the $1000 total, and give District A $400.  However, if 
one of District A’s students transfers to a community school within the district, the state will 
give $100 to the community school and deduct $100 from the amount they give to the local 
school district.  Thus, District A now has $900 to educate nine students.  But whereas before 
the student transferred to the community school forty percent of the total amount ($400/1000) 
came from the state, now only thirty-three percent ($300/900) comes from the state.  It is 
difficult to deny that the local school district has suffered a loss here, whether one 
characterizes it as local funds going to charter schools or a reduction in state aid due to charter 
schools.  Phillis, supra note 115.   
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system of Common Schools.228  However, the privatization aspects of charter schools 
discussed above, particularly in for-profit charter schools, seriously challenge the 
characterization of charter schools as public within the Constitutional Common 
School model.   
Not only are the democratic citizenship goals of Constitutional Common Schools 
fundamentally undermined by EMOs’ profit motive, but some of the tax dollars from 
the state education budget are not being spent on schools at all–they are used to 
enrich private entities.  If these EMOs were providing the same service as public 
schools–a free and adequate education for everyone and anyone in the district–this 
would be economically harmless privatization.  Just as a public school district that 
pays a private independent electrician to update the schools’ wiring considers the 
electrician’s profit part of the legitimate cost of procuring the service, the EMOs’ 
profit would be a legitimate cost of the EMO taking on the state’s responsibility for 
providing a system of Common Schools.  However, the charter school EMOs are not 
providing an education consistent with the Constitutional Common School.  The 
most recent Ohio academic achievement data shows that charter schools are doing no 
better, and in some cases worse, than comparable traditional public schools.229  
EMOs are finding ways to spend less on education–a worthy goal if possible–but 
without the innovation and statewide improvement via competition promised by 
market theory privatization adherents.230  For example, cyberschools, which provide 
few of the democratic goals of public schools, are a goldmine for private EMOs. 231  
A computer costs less than a teacher.  The flood of for-profit cyberschools in Ohio is 
a result of their economic viability, not their educational quality within the Common 
School ideal.  If EMOs are not improving educational outputs, then the argument that 
they are simply using education as a way of moving money from government to 
private pockets is even more compelling.   
C.  Predicted Outcome 
The plaintiffs in the Ohio Parents & Teachers case are unlikely to prevail before 
the Ohio Supreme Court.  The general idea that privatization itself is fundamentally 
inconsistent with the Ohio Constitution has only recent history as a legal theory, and 
no winning precedent.232  Furthermore, the Court in DeRolph IV and Lewis indicated 
                                                                
228But see Russo, supra note 79, at 23 (stating that reallocation to charter schools of public 
funds for education is an issue). 
229Id.  
230See generally LOEO Final Report, supra note 178.  Commentators also note that charter 
schools have not led to dramatic curricular innovations.  See, e.g., O’Brien, supra note 51, at 
158. 
231See Stephens, Ohio Virtually Booming With Cyber Schools, supra note 5 (noting that 
Akron Digital Academy, a cyberschool operated by a public school district, gave $500,000 of 
state aid that would have been pure profit to a private company back to the district’s general 
fund). 
232But see O’Brien & Woodrum, supra note 12, at 636-42.  O’Brien & Woodrum’s 
thorough analysis of the development of the education clause in the Ohio Constitution of 1851 
concludes that school choice is incompatible with the values of the constitutional common 
school.  “The constitutional framers . . . rejected the idea of competition among school 
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an intention to leave the specifics of the system of Common Schools in Ohio to the 
General Assembly.233 Subsequent changes in the make-up of the Ohio Supreme 
Court only strengthen this position.234  Likewise, in the aftermath of DeRolph IV it is 
particularly unlikely that the Court will embroil itself in the funding debate at the 
heart of the plaintiffs’ diversion of funds claims.  The Court has already said that the 
system is over-reliant on local property taxes, and it will not enter into the details of 
that issue again.   
Precedent from other states also favors the defendants.  Courts in Michigan, 
Pennsylvania and a few other states have rejected similar claims regarding delegating 
authority outside of local control and contracting out as an invalid method of 
assuring a thorough and efficient state system.235  Although funding concerns remain 
the most significant and unresolved legal issue for charter schools, courts tend to 
avoid these issues, preferring to leave them to legislative determination.236  A recent 
commentator analyzing state claims against charter schools with a view toward 
national trends concluded that after a decade of state constitutional challenges to 
charter school laws such challenges have not been a significant obstacle to charter 
school expansion nationally.237 
                                                          
 
districts and a variety of sectarian schools, viewing competition as inefficient, divisive, and 
ineffective.”  Id. at 640.   
233DeRolph IV, 780 N.E.2d at 533-34 (Resnick, J., concurring); Lewis, 789 N.E.2d at 202 
(stating that “because it is beyond a doubt that Judge Lewis and common pleas court patently 
and unambiguously lack jurisdiction over any post-DeRolph IV proceedings, we now grant a 
peremptory writ and end any further litigation in DeRolph v. State”).  
234Justice Sweeney and Justice Douglas, who were in the majority that declared the state 
system unconstitutional in DeRolph I, are no longer on the Court.  The dissenters, Justice 
Moyer and Justice Stratton have been joined by Justice Maureen O’Connor, Justice Terrence 
O’Donnell, and Justice Judith Ann Lanzinger, who are more ideologically aligned with 
Moyer’s nonjusticiability principle.  Sweeney and Douglas were accused of judicial activism 
in their approach to the DeRolph case by supporters of O’Donnell and Lanzinger.  See For 
Ohio Supreme Court, TOLEDO BLADE, Oct. 21, 2004, at A10.   
235Martin, supra note 183, at 68-74 (analyzing a series of state constitutional challenges to 
charter school laws).  Martin first analyzes the Michigan case, Council of Orgs. and Others for 
Educ. About Parochiaid v. Governor, 566 N.W.2d 208 (Mich. 1997), and notes that the 
Michigan Supreme Court rejected claims that charter schools were not within state control, 
inappropriately managed by un-elected entities, and channeled funds to religious schools.  Id. 
at 68; see also KEMERER, supra note 108, at 41-42 (discussing the same case as well as the 
Pennsylvania case, School Dist. of Wilkinsburg v. Wilkinsburg Educ. Ass’n, 667 A.2d 5 (Pa. 
1995)).   
236Martin, supra note 183, at 102 (noting, however, that despite the fact that state courts 
have demonstrated a tendency to avoid funding issues, funding concerns remain the most 
significant and unresolved legal issue for charter schools).  In fact, Martin notes that in a New 
Jersey case, In re Englewood, 727 A.2d 15 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999), aff’d as modified 
by 753 A.2d 687 (N.J. 2000), the appellate court held that the “thorough and efficient clause” 
in the New Jersey constitution had not been violated by funding charter schools, but noted in 
dicta that the clause might be violated if a district could show that it was harmed by having to 
fund a charter school.  Id. at 70-71. 
237Martin, supra note 183, at 91. 
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D.  Proposed Outcome 
The Ohio Supreme Court should invalidate the privatization aspects of the Ohio 
community school laws.  Ohio’s constitution guarantees a system of public education 
in the Common School tradition of “universal, free, non-sectarian education for self-
government, enlightenment, and economic advancement.”238  Privatizing education is 
fundamentally inconsistent with the Constitutional Common School.  Therefore, to 
the extent that community schools privatize education they are unconstitutional.  
Ohio’s community schools show privatization characteristics in that they deregulate 
public schools by permitting (and perhaps encouraging via market incentives) charter 
schools to abandon the notion of education for democratic self-government in favor 
of a market-based private benefits approach.     
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Constitutional “community” schools may be possible.  The initial idea of a 
neighborhood school that reflects the character of the community, is free and open to 
the public, and uses innovative and effective pedagogy is not inconsistent with the 
Constitutional Common School.  It is the infusion of market theory privatization that 
contradicts the Constitutional Common School ideal.  Therefore, Ohio’s community 
school laws should be revised to prohibit for-profit EMOs from operating 
community schools.  Cyberschools, which take the community right out of 
community schools by their very nature, should be eliminated or at least treated 
entirely independently of community schools.239  In addition, and as proposed by the 
Legislative Office of Educational Oversight, supervision of charter schools should be 
re-aligned with the original intention to trade autonomy for accountability.  Not only 
should the schools be accountable for academics, but they should also be accountable 
for fostering and maintaining the Common School purpose of their community 
school.  Therefore, the exemptions from promoting democratic citizenship under § 
3313.602(B) and (C) should be repealed. 
Education in the state of Ohio is in turmoil and traditional public schools, which 
often resort to the “factory model” of education, are not delivering on many of the 
promises of the Constitutional Common School either.240  Community schools still 
                                                                
238O’Brien & Woodrum, supra note 12, at 616. 
239The Ohio General Assembly took a step in this direction in the June, 2005 budget bill 
by placing a moratorium on new cyberschools until state officials can determine more 
effective standards and regulations for the online schools.  Scott Stephens, Measures Put 
Charter Schools on Notice: Sharper Eyes Watching for Successes or Failures, THE PLAIN 
DEALER, June 26, 2005, at B1.   
240The “factory model” of education is the dominant public school model.  Children have 
little autonomy within a patriarchal and hierarchal school structure.  Students are divided into 
age groups and spend a lot of their time working individually listening to lectures or doing 
worksheets.  O’Brien, supra note 51, at 146-48.  In their classic work on education in 
America, Bowles and Gintis argue that the traditional public school model of education –the 
“factory model” – does not foster the independent thinking crucial to democratic citizenship 
but instead teaches children to be conformist and docile.  SAMUEL BOWLES AND HERBERT 
GINTIS, SCHOOLING IN CAPITALIST AMERICA 93 in EDUCATION, INC.:  TURNING LEARNING INTO 
A BUSINESS 131, 137 (Alfie Kohn & Patrick Shannon eds., 2002).  For a more recent 
discussion of the “factory model of education” idea, see O’Brien, supra note 51, at 146-56. 
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have a role to play.  They still represent an opportunity to improve upon a factory 
model of education with a more democratically charged approach that assists all of 
Ohio’s children in becoming good, productive citizens.  The “small school” 
movement seems to be moving in that direction.241  Community schools could find 
new relevance by divorcing themselves from EMOs and exploring the possibilities of 
neighborhood “small schools.”242  By focusing charter school initiatives on small, 
community-created and community-focused schools sponsored by local school 
districts but within the context of the state Constitutional Common School ideology, 
community schools could truly become innovative public schools.  Although such a 
regulated approach to charter schools would allow for less freedom from state 
curricular standards, it would still allow for significant improvements in the “hidden 
curriculum” of the school and offer a promising alternative to the factory model of 
education.243  As O’Brien writes:  
The freedom to decide obvious structural issues – such as the size of the 
school, the length of class periods, the length and timing of holidays, the 
responsibilities of teachers and administrators, the role of students in the 
classroom, and the less obvious atmosphere issues (such as whether 
students may sit on the floor or wear hats indoors) – is the freedom to 
change the messages that are implicit in the structure, power relationships, 
and atmosphere of the school.  Personal autonomy and institutional 
flexibility, even within constraints placed on the charter school structure, 
may provide some room within the hidden curriculum for teaching 
liberty.244  
With this in mind, instead of undermining the democratic citizenship goals of the 
Constitutional Common School, charter schools could better promote those goals. 
Unfortunately,  the privatization aspects of community schools will be difficult to 
eliminate so long as the state does not allocate sufficient funds per child to provide a 
                                                                
241Small Schools, THE PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 31, 2004, at B4; Angela Townsend, ‘Small 
Schools’ Test Area Districts, THE PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 22, 2004, at B1; Chris Sheridan, 
Cutting High Schools Down to Size, THE PLAIN DEALER, July 25, 2004, at H4. 
242Russo, supra note 79, at 30-31 (recommending more support and encouragement for 
small, community-created and focused charter schools as well as local district sponsorship of 
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DEALER, Mar. 19, 2005, at B3. 
243O’Brien describes the “hidden curriculum” as  
consist[ing] of the implicit messages we give to students about differential power and 
social evaluation when students learn how schools actually work, what kinds of 
knowledge there are, which kind of knowledge is valued, and how students are viewed 
in relation to school. These are the things that are learned informally and are 
sometimes, but not always, unintentional outcomes of the formal structure and 
curricular content of schooling.  
O’Brien, supra note 51, at 150-51 (quoting KATHLEEN P. BENNETT & MARGARET D. 
LECOMPTE, THE WAY SCHOOLS WORK: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF EDUCATION 245-46 
(Naomi Silverman & Judith Harlan eds., 1990)). 
244Id. at 174-75. 
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constitutionally adequate public education.  Until the state addresses this issue, 
charter schools will compete with traditional public schools for scarce funds and 
deregulation will justify claims that charter schools are thwarting the constitutional 
requirement of a single system of Common Schools.  The market ideology 
underlying privatization welcomes competition for scarce resources.  So long as 
privatization is the guiding philosophy of state policymakers, it is less likely that 
sufficient funding per child will be allocated. 
By invalidating the privatization aspects of Ohio community school laws, the 
judicial branch could help re-direct the course of the charter school movement in 
Ohio.  Unlike the level of state funding necessary to adequately educate a child in 
Ohio, this is a justiciable issue. 245  Chapter 3314 of the Ohio Revised Code sets forth 
the laws related to community schools.246  These laws may be constitutional or not.  
If the court decides that privatization is unconstitutional, it can then invalidate 
community school laws that show sufficient privatization characteristics.  Then it 
will once again be up to the General Assembly to legislate toward a constitutional 
community school. 
NATHANIEL J. MCDONALD 
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